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ABSTRACT
Proper assessment of schizophrenia is complicated by the need for clinicians to be cognizant of
the possibility of malingering, i.e., the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated
symptoms, motivated by external incentives. Current standardized schizophrenia malingering
detection methods rely on endorsement of improbable or exaggerated, mainly positive,
symptoms. However, these detection methods may be vulnerable to successful manipulation by
sophisticated malingerers, particularly if coached regarding response style assessment strategies.
This paper explored the utility of supplementalvariables to examine in schizophrenia malingering
detection by using a simulation study design to compare schizophrenia patients, a community
participant sample instructed to feign schizophrenia symptoms, and an honest responder control
group on behavioral speech characteristics indicative of thought disorganization (i.e., referential
disturbances) and negative symptoms (i.e., alogia and flat affect) under experimentallymanipulated conditions of affective reactivity and cognitive load. Results indicated that the
feigning group was distinguishable from the schizophrenia group based on differences in
magnitude of speech disorganization during conditions of affective reactivity, due to feigners’
inability to mimic the schizophrenia group’s referential failures, andin magnitude of flat affect
during conditions of affective reactivity and cognitive load, due to feigners’ excessively impaired
use of formant inflection(i.e., vocal inflection related to tongue movement). Feigning and
schizophrenia groups were also distinguishable due to feigners’ excessive impairment in
cognitive task performance, observed both in group comparisons and differential patterns of
change in cognitive task accuracy across cognitive load conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
This study examined the utility of analyzing behavioral speech characteristics
indicative of thought disorganization (i.e., referential disturbances) and negative symptoms (i.e.,
alogia and flat affect) under experimentally-manipulated conditions of affective reactivity and
cognitive load as a potential means to increase accuracy of identification of individuals feigning
schizophrenia, using a simulation study design.The introduction begins with a brief overview of
schizophrenia and its heterogeneous symptom factors. The introduction then goes on to discuss
the issue of malingering of schizophrenia, its current methods of detection, and limitations of
those methods. The paper then proposes an alternative method of schizophrenia malingering
detection to supplement the focus of existing standardized measures on self-report of improbable
or exaggerated, mainly positive, symptoms, by examining behavioral indications of
disorganization or negative symptoms under variable conditions of affective and cognitive load,
using the Communications Disturbance Index (Docherty, DeRosa, & Andreasen, 1996) and
Computerized Assessment of Natural Speech (Cohen, Hong, & Guevara, 2010; Cohen, Minor,
Najolia, & Hong, 2009).
Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a massively debilitating mental disorder, with lifetime
population prevalence estimates ranging from .5 to 1%, and estimates of economic and societal
burdens exceeding those of most other physical and mental illnesses (Bhugra, 2005). Typical
age of onset ranges from late teens to mid-30s, with onset prior to adolescence very rare
(American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2000).Schizophrenia is operationally defined by the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000)by the
presence of two or more of the following symptoms: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized
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speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, and negative symptoms. A well-accepted
taxonomy of symptom clusters separates heterogeneous symptoms of schizophrenia into three
empirically derived and validated factor domains representing positive, negative, and
disorganization symptom complexes (see Buchanan & Carpenter, 1994, for a review of factoranalytic studies resulting in this general symptom cluster organization model). Positive
symptoms include delusions, hallucinations, and inappropriate affect; negative symptoms include
blunted affect, anhedonia, avolition, apathy, and alogia; and disorganization symptoms include
inappropriate affect, and disorganized speech and behavior. Clinical presentation of these
symptoms, though, is heterogeneous, with symptom focus varying across individuals within the
disorder (e.g., Dollfus & Brazo, 1997; Tsuang, Lyons, & Faraone, 1990).
Researchers have not yetidentified a single disease process distinct to all
schizophrenia patients, and various genetic and environmental risk factors identified thus far do
not occur systematically among patients. Instead, most current etiological theories posit a
multifactorial thresholdmodel of inheritance, whereby a large number ofpolygenes and
nonshared environmental experiences, not yet completely identified, haveinterchangeable and
additive effects on the risk for schizophrenia, which is thought to develop once some additive
threshold is reached (see Lazar, Neufeld, & Cain, 2011, for a review). However, over the past
two decades, researchers have begun searching for so-called endophenotypes—markers of
schizophrenia that are stable across symptom presentation, are present in family members, and
represent an underlying neurological vulnerability marker for the disorder (see Allen, Griss,
Folley, Hawkins, & Pearlson, 2009; and Lazar, et al., 2011, for reviews). Such proposed
endophenotypes include abnormalities in certain neuromotor functions such as smooth pursuit
and saccadic eye movements,and deficits in neuropsychological performance onmeasures of
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attention and executive functioning such as the Continuous Performance Test (Cornblatt, Risch,
Faris, Friedman, & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1988) and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task(Heaton,
1981). As discussed in further detail below, although not yet recognized as endophenotypes,
certainspeech characteristics such as referential disturbances(Docherty, Cohen, Nienow, Dinzeo,
& Dangelmaier, 2003), flat affect, and alogia(Cohen, Kim, &Najolia, 2013), have shown
promise as possible stable markers of underlying schizophrenia spectrum disorders, and may
serve as tools to increase the accuracy of distinguishing individuals with genuine schizophrenia
from malingerers.
Malingering of Schizophrenia
In addition to schizophrenia’s heterogeneous clinical presentation, proper
assessment of the disorder is further complicated by the need for clinicians to be cognizant of the
possibility of malingering, defined by the DSM-IV-TR as “the intentional production of false or
grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives”
(APA, 2000, p. 739). These external incentives fall across two broad categories: (i)
circumvention of difficult situations (e.g., incarceration or military service); and (ii) acquisition
of compensation (e.g., disability benefits) or medication(Resnick & Knoll, 2008).Exact
prevalence rates of psychosis malingering are lacking (Rogers, 2008a), in part due to
methodological limitations in establishing rates of inherently deceptive behavior, which requires
specific systematic application of identification procedures. In other words, it is difficult to
establish base rates of malingering of psychosis because only those who are unsuccessful in their
attempts to malinger can be included in prevalence estimates, and there may be more or less of
an emphasis on systematic detection in certain environments, such as forensic versus nonforensic populations(Resnick & Knoll, 2008). Standard deviations in reported base rates are
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quite high across forensic settings (SD = 14.4%; Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, & Leonard,
1998), with prevalence estimates ranging from 10-30% to as high as 50% when certain screening
measures are used (Rogers, 2008c). Although direct costs of malingering of psychosis cannot be
precisely quantified due to the difficulty in establishing prevalence rates, estimated costs of
health insurance fraud (including malingering of physical and psychological disorders) ranges
from $59 billion (in 1995) to $150 billion (reported in 2007) annually, resulting in $1050 - $1800
in increased premiums for the average family in America (Garriga, 2007; LoPiccolo, et al.,
1999). In addition, malingering causes bottlenecks in the courts, and may prevent truly ill
patients from accessing limited mental health resources (Garriga, 2007).
Furthermore, it has been suggested that regardless of its true prevalence, rates of
malingering may be expected to increase. As larger numbers of mentally ill individualsfind
themselves in situations in which mental health resources are scarce (e.g., homelessness, states in
which community mental health funding has been drastically reduced, prison), such individuals
may be incentivized to grossly exaggerate symptoms in order to secure treatment or housing
(Resnick & Knoll, 2008). With regard to this issue, it is important for clinicians not to fall prey
to the misconception that malingering precludes the possibility that a genuine underlying
psychological disorder is present (Resnick & Knoll, 2008; Rogers, 2008c), an issue that further
complicates differentiation of individuals who are truly in need of care from those without a
genuine mental illness.
Current methods of assessment ofmalingering of schizophrenia
The DSM-IV-TR classifies malingering as an “additional condition[] that may be
a focus of clinical attention” (i.e., a “v-code” classification) (APA, 2000, p. 739). It suggests that
malingering should be “strongly suspected” if any combination of the following criteria is
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present: (i) medicolegal context of presentation; (ii) marked discrepancy between the person’s
claimed stress or disability and objective findings; (iii) lack of cooperation during the diagnostic
evaluation and in complying with the prescribed treatment regimen; or (iv) the presence of
antisocial personality disorder. However, this “criminological model,” based on the assumption
that malingering is an antisocial act likely to be committed by antisocial individuals, is logically
flawed and unacceptably overestimates the presence of malingering because it merely identifies
common characteristics of malingerers (which could also be present in non-malingering
criminals) rather than factors that reliably distinguish malingerers from non-malingerers(Resnick
& Knoll, 2008; Rogers, 2008b, 2008c). In fact, the actual false-positive rate that would result
from identification of malingerers based solely on DSM-IV-TR criteria may exceed 200%
(Rogers, 1990, 2008b).
Instead, Rogers (2008c)proposes that all response styles, including malingering,
are best conceptualized within a framework of “predicted utility” of truthfulness versus
deceptiveness (i.e., any attempts by individuals to distort or misrepresent self-report), which can
vary from situation to situation. Due to this variability in predicted utility of deceptiveness across
situations or even at various time points within a situation, patterns of dissimulation are therefore
more appropriately termed “response sets,” i.e., a temporary and context-specific style, than
“response styles,” a more enduring person-centered tendency to respond in a certain way across
situations (Otto, 2008). However, in order to maintain consistency with the majority of the
malingering literature, this paper will refer to these deliberate distortions in self-report as
“response styles,” regardless of variability across contexts.
Given the limitations of the assessment approach indicated by suggested DSM-IV
criteria, Rogers(2008b) proposes that proper malingering detection strategies should instead
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utilize “a standardized method that is conceptually based and empirically validated [optimally
through use of both simulation designs and known-groups comparisons, as explained in greater
detail below] for systematically differentiating a specific response style (e.g., malingering or
defensiveness) from other response styles (e.g., honest responding)” (p. 16, italics removed).(See
also Rogers, 2008e, for an in-depth discussion of the limitations of unstandardized clinical
malingering assessments.) Rogers’ proposal that malingering detection strategies should be
based on empirically-validated standardized measures is consistent with the broader position of
researchers (e.g., Grove & Meehl, 1996)who insist more generally that structured clinical
measures are crucial for improving reliability and accuracy of diagnosis. The importance of
utilizing such standardized measures to bolster the accuracy of clinical judgment in the
assessment of malingering is highlighted by the classic Rosenhan (1973)study in which eight
individuals feigning atypical auditory hallucinations were admitted as psychiatric inpatients
diagnosed with schizophrenia and remained hospitalized for periods ranging from 9 to 52 days,
despite the fact that they ceased simulating any psychotic symptoms upon admission.Yet a large
portion of the literature directed to clinical practitioners regarding the detection of malingering of
psychosis continues to focus on educating clinicians about informal detection strategies based on
in-depth understanding of typical content and presentation style of positive psychotic symptoms
(i.e., hallucinations and delusions) (e.g., Resnick, 1993; Resnick & Knoll, 2008).While
understanding of typical positive symptom presentation has undoubtedly advanced since the
Rosenhan (1973)study, many clinicians remain reluctant to identify malingering, which may be
based in part on fear of litigation and the drastic negative consequences forindividuals
misclassified, including denial of care and stigma (Resnick & Knoll, 2008). Again, the
uncertainty surrounding identification of malingering of psychosis underscores the importance of
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a systematic detection approach, as opposed to relying on a global clinical impression (Resnick
& Knoll, 2008). Improvement of standardized detection methods, including broadening of
detection methods beyond the current focus of standardized measures on self-report of primarily
positive symptoms, may alleviate some of this burden on subjective clinical judgment.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that even standardized test
protocolsremain tools only, to which clinical expertise and idiopathic contextual knowledge must
be applied in interpretation. Standardized measurescan only be used to suggestdissimulation or
feigning, i.e., “the deliberate fabrication or gross exaggeration of psychological or physical
symptoms without any assumptions about its goals” (Rogers, 2008c, p. 5, italics added; Rogers
& Bender, 2003). Psychological tests therefore can only indicate the likely presence of an
exaggerated or fabricated response style, and cannot be used to conclusively establish
malingering, or provide a differential diagnosis with regard to the possibility of factious
disorders (i.e., feigning motivated by the desire to assume a “sick role”), conversion disorders, or
other disorders that might typically present with symptom endorsement styles of an exaggerated
nature such as borderline personality disorder(APA, 2000). These diagnostic distinctions
necessitate the application of clinical judgment regarding the likely motivation for a feigning
response style(Otto, 2008). As such, the procedures proposed herein refer to detection of a
feigning response style, not “malingering” per se. Furthermore, as noted above, even if
malingering is clinically identified, malingering and mental illness are not mutually
exclusive(Resnick & Knoll, 2008; Rogers, 2008c). One advantage of examining the variables
measuredin this study, as described in greater detail below, is that it combines measurement of
response style patterns that are both predicted to be present in malingerers but not genuine
schizophrenia patients with response style patterns that are predicted to be present in genuine

7

schizophrenia patients but not in malingerers, thus simultaneously providing a rich assessment
ofevaluation presentation characteristics indicating both malingering and genuine presence of the
disorder.
Currently utilized assessment tools. Current standardized methods to assess
malingering of psychosis generally examine content of self-report in relationship to positive
symptoms of psychosis (i.e., hallucinations and delusions). These measures seek to identify one
of two broad categories of response styles thought to be indicative of malingering: unlikely
presentations (including rare symptoms, quasi rare symptoms, improbable symptoms, symptom
combinations, and spurious patterns of psychopathology); and amplified presentations in terms
of frequency and intensity of symptoms and endorsement of symptoms that may appear plausible
to malingerers based on general misconceptions about mental illness (including indiscriminant
symptom endorsement, symptom severity, obvious symptoms, reported versus observed
symptoms, and erroneous stereotypes) (see Rogers, 2008b, for an in-depth description of the
strengths and limitations of each of these assessment strategies).
Rogers (2008a)cites the unlikely presentation of rare symptoms, which focuses on
a high endorsement rate among malingerers on self-report items that are endorsed by less than
5% of individuals with actual disorders and yields large to very large effect sizes, as the “work
horse” among currentmethods of assessment of feigned mental disorders(p. 392). Examples of
scales using this approachcontained in measures designed specifically to detect malingering of
mental disorders include the Rare Symptoms scale of the Structured Interview of Reported
Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992)and Unusual Hallucinations scale of the
Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms (M-FAST; Miller, 2001). (For an in-depth discussions
of the more extensive SIRS, which utilizes several of the response style assessment methods
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cited above, see Rogers, 2008e.For a review ofbrief screening measures such as the M-FAST, as
well as theM Test (Beaber, Marston, Michelli, & Mills, 1985)and Structured Inventory of
Malingered Symptomatology(Smith & Burger, 1997), seeSmith, 2008.)In addition, identification
of unlikely presentation of rare symptoms is also the key detection method of theNegative
Impression Management scale of the Personality Assessment Inventory (NIM scale of the PAI;
Morey, 2007) and the F-psychiatric scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2
(MMPI-2;Hathaway, McKinley, & Butcher, 1990)(Rogers, 2008b). (For a more in-depth review
of malingering assessment using the embedded scales of the MMPI-2 and PAI, see Greene,
2008, andSellbom & Bagby, 2008, respectively.) The rare symptoms method is contrasted with
the “quasi-rare symptoms” method, such as is utilized by the MMPI-2 F and F-back scales,
which focuses on symptoms that are rare in normative populations, and may result in
unacceptable levels of false positives due to the fact that individuals with genuine disorders may
also endorse such symptoms. It may also be contrasted with the improbable symptom method,
such as is utilized by the SIRS Improbable and Absurd Symptoms scale, which represents an
extreme version of rare symptoms by focusing on fantastic or preposterous symptoms, but may
lead to a high rate of false negatives among sophisticated malingerers due to the high face
validity of these items(Rogers, 2008b). Projective measures, such as the Rorschach(Rorschach,
1921), while once thought to be impervious to deliberate response distortion due to their lack of
face validity, have been generally demonstrated to be wholly unsuccessful at identifying
malingering (see Sewell, 2008, for a review).
Self-report of improbable or grossly exaggerated positive symptomology may be
most useful in detecting unsophisticated obvious attempts at malingering. While “[m]alingerers
with relatively poor understanding of the phenomenology of genuine psychosis may be readily
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detected…malingerers who possess shrewdness and detailed knowledge of psychosis may
deceive even seasoned forensic clinicians”(Resnick & Knoll, 2008, p. 51). For example, the
specificity and positive predictive power of the SIRS, which has been termed the “gold standard”
in malingering detection (Rogers, 2008e), are reported as 99.5% and 99%, respectively; but
sensitivity and negative predictive power are reported at only 48.5% and 64.9% (in a population
with a malingering base rate of 51%), respectively (Green, Rosenfeld, Dole, Pivovarova, & Zapf,
2008; Rogers, Bagby,& Dickens, 1992;see also Sellbom & Bagby, 2008, discussing the
limitations of the PAI NIM scale in detecting sophisticated malingerers).
Importantly, coaching about response style detection methods can affect the
results of many of these tests (Chesterman, Terbeck, & Vaughan, 2008;Rogers, 2008a).For
example, many studies have found that being provided with information about the validity scales
of the MMPI-2 helps simulators avoid detection (Greene, 2008).Furthermore, increased
dissemination of strategies to avoid detection via the Internet continues to increase the risk that
coaching may adversely affect the sensitivity of these existing measures that rely solely on
explicit symptom endorsement (an issue suggested for future research by Smith (2008)). As
illustration, a simple online search for “schizophrenia malingering” using Google’s search engine
revealed publicly-accessible, easily-understandable detailed information about symptoms
endorsed by individuals with genuine psychosis, and a test-by-test description of specific
malingering detection strategies, including feigned symptomsthat distinguish malingerers, within
the first three search results (e.g., Detecting Malingering,retrieved 8/17/11).
Examining Behaviorally-Based Speech Characteristics Under Controlled Conditions of
Variable Affective and Cognitive Load to Identify Feigning of Schizophrenia
It has been noted by anecdotal clinical observation(Resnick, 1993; Resnick &
Knoll, 2008)that the self-reported content of delusions and hallucinations are generally the focus
10

of malingerers’ self-report as they are easier to feign due to their obvious nature; but malingerers
rarely attempt to feign other important symptoms of schizophrenia, such as formal thought
disorder or more subtle negative symptoms such as flat affect and alogia. Yet despite the
emphasis placed on clinical recognition of the incongruence of reporting significant positive
symptomsin the absence of these other signs of schizophrenia as a red flag for the identification
of malingering (e.g., Resnick & Knoll, 2008), there is very little research examining the
usefulness of capitalizing on this phenomenon in malingering detection in a more structured
manner, and no indication that any standardized assessment of disorganization or negative
symptoms has been incorporated into malingering assessment in clinical practice as part of
anyroutinely utilized systemized procedures.
This paper thus examinedthrough empirical means this persistent clinical
observation that malingerers self-report assumed content of positive symptoms but rarely exhibit
thought disorganization or negative symptoms, by analyzing speech characteristics indicative of
thought disorganization, alogia, and flat affect under experimentally-manipulated conditions of
affective reactivity andcognitive load. A particular strength of this approach to malingering
assessment is that it makes use of two detection strategies—symptom combinations and spurious
patterns of psychopathology—which have been proposed asespecially useful in combating the
effects of coaching, as the complex patterns of symptoms found in genuine disorders may be too
difficult for even sophisticated malingerers to effectively deliberately feign (Rogers, 2008a).
Furthermore, increasing cognitive load may have a similar effect to the recommend lengthy
interview (i.e., intended to capitalize on the fact that as malingerers become fatigued it is more
difficult to consistently maintain feigned symptoms) (e.g., Resnick, 1993; Resnick & Knoll,
2008); but within a much shorter time frame and in a more structured manner. In addition, while

11

the behavioral pattern of speech performance under variable levels of cognitive load provides the
key elements for this proposed method of malingering detection, research indicates that
individuals feigning psychosis frequently also attempt to feign cognitive impairment (Resnick &
Knoll, 2008). Thus, the cognitive tests themselves may provide yet another dimension of
malingering assessment, based on a detection strategy with elements of the performance curve
(i.e., based on the finding that genuine patients produce predictable patterns of errors with
increased item difficulty, while malingerers usually demonstrate much less of a distinction
between easy and difficult items) and floor effect (i.e., based on the finding that some
malingerers do not recognize that simple cognitive tasks could be completed by impaired
individuals) methods of assessment of feigned cognitive impairment (see Rogers, 2008b, for an
in-depth review of the strengths and limitations of detection strategies used to assess feigned
cognitive impairment).
Communication Disturbances Index
Communication disturbances are a fundamental symptom ofdisorders marked by
disordered thought processes, including schizophrenia and mania(Docherty, DeRosa, et al.,
1996). Docherty’s(2005) research supports a model whereby communication failures are a
behavioral manifestation of speech disorder that results from the overlapping but conceptually
distinct constructs of thought disorder, disorganization, and neurocognitive impairments.
This paper measured communication disturbance(CD) in terms of deficits in
clarity of meaning of speech through use of the Communication Disturbances Index (CDI;
Docherty, DeRosa, et al., 1996), a method of identifying subtle forms of referential failuresin
natural language that has revealed consistent differences between schizophrenia patients and
controls, particularly under conditions of emotional stress. The CDI rates severity of

12

communication disturbance along six dimensions of referential failure (vague references,
confused references, missing information, ambiguous word meanings, wrong word references,
and structural unclarities), to arrive at a total communication disturbances score, as described in
greater detail below (see Methods). It has been proposed that these types of referential failures
may reflect: (1) lack of awareness or attention to the listener’s needs in understanding a
communication—i.e., an assumption that the listener will understand the speaker’s thoughts
without being told, (2) errors in distinguishing between previous communications and previous
thoughts, or (3) confusion among referents; all of which may reflect disturbances in the patient’s
understanding of boundaries between the speaker and listener, between the patient’s inner world
and the outer world, or among people or objects(Docherty, 1995).
In affectively-neutral conditions (i.e., interviews using open-ended questions
about daily activities, routines, hobbies, leisure activities),use of the CDI has revealed
significantly higher rates of CD among schizophrenia patients as compared to
nonpsychiatriccontrols (Docherty, 2005; Docherty, et al., 2003), with effect sizes (Cohen’s
d)ranging from .98 – 1.14. It is noteworthy that this magnitude of difference is consistent with
effect sizes suggested by Rogers (2008b) as key for obtaining systematic differentiation of
response styles (moderate = Cohen’s d ≥ 0.75; large ≥ 1.25; very large ≥ 1.50).CDI scores have
been shown to be correlated with formal thought disorder and conceptual disorganization ratings,
in addition to cognitive deficits (Docherty, 2005). CDI scores have demonstrated good temporal
stability over two weeks and nine months, regardless of positive or negative symptom
fluctuations(Docherty, et al., 2003). It is notable that CD in the Docherty, et al. (2003) study
showed greater stability than broader clinical formal thought disorder ratings. In addition to the
possibility that CDis more trait-like than formal thought disorder, these differences in stability
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also raise the possibility that the standardized method of examining referential failures using the
CDI may provide important psychometric improvements over subjective clinician ratings, which
may be subject to issues such as halo effects.
Communication disturbances under conditions of variable affective load.
“Affective reactivity” refers to the phenomenon that speech disturbances have been shown to
increase among schizophrenia patients under conditions of emotional stress (i.e., when
discussing affectively negative topics) (e.g., Docherty, Rhinewine, Nienow, & Cohen, 2001).
Importantly, use of the affective reactivity paradigm in examining CD has revealed specific
patterns of CD exacerbation under affective strain that are unique to schizophrenia. While the
temporal stability of CD in schizophrenia (Docherty, et al., 2003) and similarities between
schizophrenia patients and first-degree relatives (Docherty, 1995) under affectively neutral
conditions may “support the idea that referential disturbances reflect stable, trait-like cognitive
characteristics of patients, characteristics that may actually be related to vulnerability more than
to overt illness” (Docherty, et al., 2003, p.474), schizophrenia patients show more affective
reactivity (i.e., increased CD under unpleasant emotion conditions) than their parents or
controls(Docherty, Hall, & Gordinier, 1998). These results have been interpreted to suggest that
“reactivity of referential communication disturbances may reflect normal processes that are
exaggerated in schizophrenia” (p. 465). Interestingly, while controls in the Docherty et al. (1998)
study did demonstrate some increase in CD in the affectively unpleasant condition, parents did
not demonstrate any significant differences in going from the pleasant to unpleasant condition,
which the authors note may reflect a protective factor among non-psychiatric individuals with
possible genetic vulnerability to schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Similarly, while depressed
patients demonstrated higher levels of CD than controls using the CDI, schizophrenia patients
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still demonstrated more frequent total referential failures than depressed patients; and only
schizophrenia patients, but not depressed patients,demonstrated increased CD due to affective
reactivity(Rubino et al., 2011). Relatedly, while baseline rates of CD are not associated with
positive symptom severity, magnitude of increase in CD under conditions of affective reactivity
are (Docherty & Hebert, 1997).
With regard to its potential utility as a tool to assist in the detection of
malingering, examination of referential failures using the CDI maybe a more sensitive measure
than other communication disturbance measures that focus on broad manifestations of thought
disorder, such as topic changes and circumstantiality(e.g., the Scale for Assessment of Thought,
Language, and Communication (Andreasen, 1986)). (See Docherty, 2005, for a more in-depth
comparison of communication disturbances as examined through referential failures with
measures of thought disorder and disorganization that focus on speech behavior more likely to
reflect loose associations, such as topic derailment; see also Kerns, 2007.) Broad disorganization
symptomssuch as blatant tangentiality may be more likely to be seen in malingerers attempting
to “[t]alk stupid, dumb, and crazy…[and not] complete sentences…” (quoted from a letter from
an identified malingerer to his incarcerated girlfriend, instructing her to “[s]tart talking about
any- and everything. Keep changing subjects,” (Resnick & Knoll, 2008, p. 65)). By contrast,
malingerers may be less likely to understand how to feign more subtle referential failures. Thus,
whenResnick and Knoll (2008) have cautioned clinicians to be alert to the possibility of
malingering in the absence of signs of formal thought disorder, these more subtle signs of
communication disturbance may have also contributed to their clinical impressions. The CDI
provides a useful means to quantify such clinical impressionsof subtle behavioral signs to allow
for rigorous empirical comparison between groups.
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Communication disturbances under conditions of variable cognitive
load.Another standardized conditional manipulation that could reveal important differences
between malingerers and genuine schizophrenia patients is cognitive load manipulation. First,
with regard to the cognitive tasks themselves, Kertzman et al.(2006) compared performance of
genuine schizophrenia patients and suspected malingers on two tasks of variable cognitive
load—the first was a simple visual reaction time task that required participants to press a red key
every time a red square was displayed on a screen, and the second was a visual choice reaction
time task required participations to press a red key if a red square was displayed and a black key
if a black square was displayed. Not only did the malingering group perform significantly worse
than the schizophrenia group across the dependent variables (reaction time, variability in reaction
time, and accuracy) in both conditions; but, more importantly, the malingering group
demonstrated the opposite pattern from the schizophrenia group when comparing the lower to
higher cognitive load. While the schizophrenia group’s performance was worse on the second,
more difficult task, the malingerers’ performance was worse on the first, easier task. These
results are consistent with research indicating that individuals feigning psychosis frequently also
attempt to feign cognitive impairment (Resnick & Knoll, 2008). Furthermore, this design takes
advantage of more sophisticated methodology by comparing malingerers and genuine patients
not just on severity of cognitive deficits, but also on patterns of cognitive performance on tasks
of varying difficulty. Only t-tests were performed in this study comparing the two groups, and
thus significance of the directional within-group between tasks differences and the group by task
condition interaction are unknown; but the direction of the low-to-high load condition cognitive
performance patterns suggests an interesting element of information that could be added to a
malingering assessment procedure. The presentstudy expanded on this paradigm by
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simultaneously assessing patterns of cognitive performance and verbal behavior under variable
loads of working memory demand.
Pursuant to “cognitive load theory,” subtle forms of communication disturbances
characteristic of schizophrenia should be exacerbated under conditions of high cognitive
load.Cognitive load theory originated as a framework for maximizing the efficiency of the
learning process by facilitating changes in long term memory through minimization of
extraneous working memory load (see Paas, Van Gog, & Sweller, 2010; and Sweller, 2010, for
reviews). The theory is based, in part, on recognition of the well-established fact that working
memory, the site of conscious information processing, is very limited in capacitywhen
processing novel information(Baddeley, 1986; Miller, 1956). Thus, reducing working memory
load provides for more efficient cognitive processing. Over the past decade, a handful of
schizophrenia-spectrum disorder researchers have begun to use this concept of manipulation of
working memory load to achieve the opposite goal—i.e., straining cognitive processing
capacity—in order to experimentally exacerbate and thus gain greater understanding of language
and prosody dysfunction in the disorder (e.g., Melinder & Barch, 2003). While increased
working memory load has been shown, to some extent, to decrease amount, rate, inflection, and
intensity of speech in even healthy controls (Cohen, Morrison, Brown, & Minor, 2011),
examination of speech dysfunction in schizophrenia under variable conditions of working
memory load has revealed specific patterns in magnitude of exacerbation of diminished
expressivity (Cohen, McGovern, Dinzeo, & Covington, manuscript in preparation; Melinder &
Barch, 2003). Additionally, although patterns of referential failures have generally been studied
more extensively in the context of affective reactivity, research on the specific relationship
between working memory and communication disturbances in schizophrenia spectrum disorders
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supports the proposition that examination of communication disturbance patterns under variable
levels of cognitive load may also provide rich information in distinguishing genuine
schizophrenia patients from feigners.
Melinder and Barch(2003) found thatwhat they termed “negative thought
disorder” (i.e., verbal productivity, syntactic complexity, poverty of speech, pausing, and
blocking) increased among schizophrenia patients in a condition of high cognitive load
(answering neutral open-ended questions while completing a forced-choice continuous
performance task whereby participants pressed one key in response to a target word stimulus and
another in response to other stimuli), as compared to a condition of low cognitive load(answering
neutral open-ended questions, such as “describe a typical day for you”), butclinically-rated
formal thought disorder (discourse coherence and fluency deficits) did not. In addition, they
found that negative thought disorder and formal thought disorder were inversely relatedin the
high load condition. The authors reasoned that this supports the theory that both types of speech
disturbance reflect different manifestations of coping with basic working memory deficitsunder
cognitively taxing situations. Relatedly, discourse coherence in this study (but not fluency) was
correlated with performance during a non-speaking trial on the category monitoring task, which
relies on maintenance of a target stimulus in memory, and negative thought disorder was
correlated with performance on a speaking span task requiring generation of a sentence for
provided word stimuli, which places demands on the ability to generate a message plan. This is
consistent with previous research noted by the authors indicating that language production
requires the simultaneous performance of several tasks, including generating a message plan,
maintaining the message plan and prior discourse facts, and monitoring ongoing speech for
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errors (Levelt, 1989), some or all of which may require working memory performance
(Daneman, 1991).
One limitation to the Melinder and Barch (2003) study that was addressed by the
present study relates to how CD was measured. Formal thought disorderin the Melinder and
Barch(2003) study was rated according to the Scale for the Assessment of Thought, Language,
and Communication (Andreasen, 1986), which asks clinicians to rate the frequency of
disturbances in discourse coherence (nonsequiturs, tangential responses, derailments, loss of a
goal, distractibility, and pronominal reference errors), disturbances in fluency (neologisms, word
approximations, incoherence), disturbances in content (perseverations and illogicality), and
disturbances in social convention (poverty of content, circumstantiality).As noted, the CDI, by
contrast, measures more subtle referential failures. Thus, difference in these more subtle
referential failures could potentially be revealed by CDI scores across cognitive load conditions.
In addition, the Melinder and Barch(2003) study compared performance on a free speech task to
speech performance during a cognitive task with a single level of difficulty. By contrast, the
“cognitive load” task used in this study compared speech performance during a free speech
condition to speech performance during two separate cognitive tasks of varying working memory
demand (one similar to that used in the Melinder and Barch(2003) study, and a second 1-back
task that poses even higher working memory demands; see Methods), which could potentially
reveal more intricate group difference in patterns of CD across cognitive load conditions. It also
must be recalled that a key issue in this study was comparison of patterns of speech disturbance
under varying levels of working memory load between genuine patients and feigners, whereas
the Melinder and Barch(2003) study examined only within-group differences across cognitive
load conditions among schizophrenia patients.
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Research examining the cognitive correlates of CD using the CDI indicates that
CD is strongly related to working memory deficits, and may thus be vulnerable to exacerbation
under manipulation of working memory load. The CDI has been shown to be related to more
basic cognitive deficits in schizophrenia, including sustained attention on two visual continuous
performance tasks on which participants were instructed to press a button every time a target
digit appeared (one with difficulty level increased by visual degradation of the stimuli), two trailmaking sequencing tasks of variable working memory load(one requiring participants to link
numbers sequentially, e.g., 1…2…3…, the second requiring participant to alternately link
numbers and letters sequentially), and the conceptual sequencing subtest of the Shipley Institute
of Living Scale(Shipley, 1940), which requires participants to complete sequences of numbers or
letters based on different implicit conceptual organization methods(Docherty, 2005; see also
Kerns, 2007; andKerns & Berenbaum, 2003, finding a link between working memory/n-back
task performance deficits and CD in schizophrenia). Interestingly, neither clinically-rated formal
thought disorder, as measured using the Global Thought Disorder subscale from the Scale for
Assessment of Positive Symptoms(Andreasen, 1983), which measures broad manifestations of
thought disorder such as derailment, pressure of speech, tangentiality, circumstantiality,
illogicality, distractibility, clang associations, and incoherence, nor clinically-rated conceptual
disorganization, measured using Conceptual Disorganization subscale of the Brief Psychiatric
Rating Scale(Overall & Gorham, 1962), which asks clinicians to rate the extent to which speech
is structurally disorganized, were correlated with these basic working memory measures. Only
the two trail-making sequencing tests were correlated with CDI scores among controls—the two
sustained visual attention tasks, which are much more similar to the cognitive tasks that were
utilized in this study, were not.Similarly, in a prior study, Docherty et al.(1996) found that
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among schizophrenia patients referential failures were associated with working memory deficits
but not concept formation and verbal fluency; whereas among individuals with bipolar disorder
or non-psychiatric controls, referential failures were associated with concept formation and
verbal fluency, but not working memory deficits. Furthermore, Docherty(2005) found that
simple working memory deficits remained significantly related to CDI scores even after ratings
of global level of functioning and global severity of illness were controlled for using hierarchical
regression analysis. (After entering low-load attention measures into the hierarchical model,
high-load versions of the same task did not explain significant amounts of additional variability
in the Docherty (2005) study, but this is likely due to the large amount of shared variance
attributed to the low-load condition.)
Interestingly, research among schizotypal participants, i.e., individuals who are
theorized to be at-risk for development of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, suggests that the
increase in CD found when discussing unpleasant memories using the affective reactivity
paradigm (see above) may actually reflect underlying attention deficits. Kerns and Becker
(2008) found that working memory deficits were associated with affective reactivity of CD in
individuals with elevated disorganized schizotypy symptoms, and that after controlling for
working memory deficits schizotypy and control group differences in CD were no longer
significant. Therefore, manipulating working memory load by having participants provide free
speech samples while simultaneously completing cognitive tasks that deplete working memory
resources may provide a more direct means of exacerbating schizophrenia-spectrum related CD
than the affective reactivity paradigm, which requires participants to subjectively appraise the
unpleasant emotional condition as “stressful” in order for group differences in CD to be revealed
(Docherty & Grillon, 1995).
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Flat affect and alogia as measured using the CANS procedure
Examination of negative speech-related schizophrenia symptoms may provide yet
another dimension of richness to assessment of malingering in schizophrenia. Such symptoms
include alogia (e.g., poverty of speech) and flat affect (e.g., lack of prosodic expressivity in
speech). While these symptoms have traditionally been measured using Likert-type clinician
rating scales such as the Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (Andreasen, 1984),
over the past decade refinements have been made in utilizing more sophisticated computerized
analysis protocols to more precisely measure verbal expressivity through examination of acoustic
properties of speech, including alogia (operationalized by measuring periods of speech
production versus pauses), and flat or blunted affect (operationalized by examining variability of
volume and frequency) (Computerized Assessment of Natural Speech, or “CANS”; e.g., Cohen,
et al., 2009, 2010).Generally, these variables have demonstrated moderate to good temporal
stability over a week’s period (Cohen, et al., 2013).
Utilization of computerized acoustic analysis to examine verbal expressivity
provides significant improvement over use of clinical ratings, which are more vulnerable to
imprecision due to global impression (Alpert, Shaw, Pouget, & Lim, 2002). Furthermore,
computerized acoustic analysis of verbal expressivity may provide psychometric benefits for
precision in use of parametric statistics, as it can produce normally-distributed ratio-level data, as
compared to clinical ratings that often form skewed data distributions, are ordinal in nature, and
are generally restricted in range (Cohen, Alpert, Nienow, Dinzeo, & Docherty, 2008).
Flat affect and alogia under conditions of variable affective load.In contrast to
CD, a literature review revealed no existing published studies examining changes of in-themoment vocal prosody or clinically-rated verbal expressivity in schizophrenia under
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experimentally-manipulated conditions of affective load. However, among healthy adults, higharousal affectively-valenced autobiographical tasks have been associated with such prosody
changes of small effect sizes (Cohen, et al., 2010). Furthermore, given the relationships in
schizophrenia between working memory load and diminished verbal expressivity (Kerns, 2007),
and between working memory deficits and affective reactivity of CD (Docherty, 2005; Docherty,
Hawkins, et al., 1996; Kerns, 2007; Kerns & Berenbaum, 2003), it is logical that diminished
expressivity may be subject to similar principles of affective reactivity.
Flat affect and alogia under conditions of variable cognitive load.As discussed
above, Melinder and Barch(2003) found that clinician ratings of negative speech characteristics
are exacerbated under conditions of higher cognitive load. Similarly, clinically-rated blunt affect
and alogia are associated with exaggerated reduction in computer-analyzed expressivity in
conditions of increased cognitive load among individuals with both schizophrenia and depression
(Cohen, et al., 2013, manuscript in preparation). Furthermore, working memory deficits are
associated with negative speech symptoms (see Kerns, 2007—working memory and controlled
retrieval interacted to predict poverty of speech).
Study Design
Studies of feigning assessment measures generally utilize one of two main
designs—the simulation design and known-groups comparisons (see generally Rogers, 2008c).
Most research employs the simulation paradigm, an analog design by which community (or more
often, undergraduate) participants are randomly assigned to an honest or feigning (i.e., instructed
to attempt to present oneself “as if” a certain disorder were present) condition. The
performances of these groups are then compared to the performance of a genuine clinical
sample(i.e., individuals believed to actually have the disorder at issue). The simulation design
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provides strong internal validity due to its standardized method and partially experimental
design, but weak external validity due to the low personal stakes of the artificial situation and
resulting lack of motivation to successfully feign a disorderthat might be present in a true
malingering context.
By contrast, a known-groups paradigm compares a genuine clinical sample and
actual suspected malingerers, as identified by independent experts. As such, its validity rests on
accurate a priori identification of malingering and clinical groups, and blindness of the
researchers administering the target assessment test to participants’ group membership.
Assuming accurate classification of participants, although internal validity is weak due to the
lack of experimental control, the known-groups comparison design provides strong external
validity. Somewhat similar to the known-groups comparison is a bootstrapping comparison; but
in the bootstrapping comparison design participants are placed in high-probability groups of
feigners and genuine patients using stringent cut scores on previously-established measures of
feigning instead of independent expert identification. However, malingering assessment
methods supported by such designs run the risk of being clinically useful only in cases of
extreme, unsophisticated malingering presentations. Alternatively, some researchers have
utilized a differential prevalence design in an attempt to approximate the known groups design.
This design compares performance on measures by individuals in different assessment or referral
contexts (i.e., litigation v. non-litigation), based on the assumption that base rates of malingering
will be higher in one group than the other, and therefore differences between the groups reflect
differences in malingerers and non-malingerers. As noted by Rogers(2008c), “[s]uch simplistic
thinking should not be tolerated in clinical research [and should not purport to identify utility
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estimates of a measure], although it may play a marginal role in advancing theory” (p. 11-12; see
also Rogers, 2008d).
The present study employed a simulation design, which is consistent with Rogers’
(2008d) recommendation that “[t]he logicalsequence of development of an assessment
method[is] with simulation studies [which provide the advantages of comparative ease in
obtaining participants and the ability to refine measures under systematic conditions] followed
by known-groups comparisons…[which] are best used to cross-validate results of simulation
studies”(p. 427).
Hypotheses
This study compared the speech characteristics of “honest” healthy controls (i.e.,
individuals instructed to complete the speech and cognitive performance tasks without special
instruction), “feigners” (i.e., healthy controls instructed to complete the speech and cognitive
performance tasks as if to convince an evaluator that they have schizophrenia), and a genuine
schizophrenia group, under conditions of variable affective and cognitive load. It was expected
that feigners would attempt to exaggerate cognitive deficits by intentionally performing poorly
on the cognitive performance tasks, but would not be able to successfully feign the more subtle
referential failures and expressivity deficits found in the schizophrenia group on either speech
task. In both tasks, overall group differences and group differences in patterns of behavior when
comparing conditions of low to high affective and cognitive load were examined. Specifically, it
was hypothesized that:
I.

When participants wereasked to speak about affectively-valenced topics, there
would be:
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a. significant main effectsfor participant group, such that the schizophrenia
group would demonstrate significantly more overall referential failures on the
CDI and expressivity deficits on the CANS than both the honest control
group(Docherty, et al., 1998)and feigners (based on Resnick and
Knoll’s(2008)clinical observations), who would not differ from one another;
and
b. significant interactions between group and affective condition variables, such
that the magnitude of increase in referential failures on the CDI and
expressivity deficits on the CANSfor the schizophrenia group in comparing
the pleasant condition to the unpleasant condition and/or the low-arousal to
high-arousal conditionwould be significantly largerthan for controls
(Docherty, et al., 1998)orfeigners(Resnick & Knoll, 2008).
II.

Similarly, when participants were asked to provide neutral speech samples while
either performing no cognitive task or simultaneously performing cognitive tasks
of variable working memory demand, there would be:
a. significant main effects for participant group, such that the schizophrenia
group would demonstrate significantly more overall referential failures,
alogia, and vocal prosody deficits than the honest control group(Docherty,
2005; Melinder & Barch, 2003) and feigners (Resnick & Knoll, 2008), who
would not differ from one another; and
b. significant interactions between group and condition, such that the magnitude
of increase in referential failuresfor the schizophrenia group as working
memory load increased by task would be significantly larger than for controls
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(Docherty, 2005) or feigners (Resnick & Knoll, 2008), as would the
magnitude of increase in alogia and prosody deficits (Cohen, et al., manuscript
in preparation; Melinder & Barch, 2003; Resnick & Knoll, 2008).
III.

In addition, when participants were asked to complete cognitive performance
tasks of variable working memory demand, there would be:
a. a significant group effect, such that the feigners would demonstrate poorer
overall cognitive performance compared to the schizophrenia group
(Kertzman, et al., 2006), who would in turn demonstrate poorer overall
cognitive performance compared to the honest control group (Melinder &
Barch, 2003); and
b. a significant interaction, such that the schizophrenia and honest control groups
would perform worse during conditions of higherworking memory load than a
lower working memory load condition; but feigners would perform worse
during thelower load condition than a higherworking memory load condition
(Kertzman, et al., 2006).
Thus, consistent with most current methods of malingering detection (Rogers,

2008b),cognitive performance outcome variables were expected to aid in identification of
feigners because the feigners’ deliberate attempts to appear mentally ill would reveal patterns
that distinguish them from both genuine schizophrenia patients and controls, as they were
expected to behave in ways that were irrelevant to or excessive in severity when compared to
individuals with schizophrenia. By contrast, it was expected that vocal pattern differences under
conditions of variable affective and cognitive load would differentiate feigners from individuals
with schizophrenia because feigners would not be able to deliberately exhibitsubtle verbal
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behavior that is persistent in and specific to schizophrenia, and thus feigners would not perform
significantly differently than honest controls. In this manner, vocal pattern differences would be
similar to EEG potentials examined byZarkowski, Esparza, and Russo (2007), who found
thatmalingerers failed to show EEG potentials that are present in genuine schizophrenia patients,
and thus looked more like controls (see also Anderson, Trethowan, and Kenna’s(1959) study of
feigning of pseudo-dementia, in which patients demonstrated perseveration but feigners did not,
and thus the authors suggested that this pattern of perseveration could be used to rule out
malingering).This approach—i.e., including measurement of behavioral markers specific to
schizophrenia which may support the presence of a genuine disorder—mayprovide the added
benefit of lowering the risk of false-positive errors among individuals with schizophrenia who
exaggerate their positive symptoms in an unsophisticated manner (the most likely to be detected,
e.g., on the SIRS)—as individuals may do when they actually are in need of treatment, but
resources are scarce (e.g., in prison;Resnick & Knoll, 2008). For example, by examining EEG
potentials specific to schizophrenia patients,Zarkowski, et al. (2007) identified one likely
genuine patient who, upon detailed re-examination of the participant selection process, appeared
to have been placed in the “malingering” group based on false positive resultson the SIRS.
Furthermore, combining these two strategies for detection of feigning of schizophrenia may
reveal patterns that bolster the accuracy of detection of feigning by even sophisticated
malingerers(Rogers, 2008a).
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METHODS
Participants
Participants in the present study comprised the following groups: individuals with
schizophrenia,control participants recruited from the community surrounding Louisiana State
University (i.e., “honest responders”), and a feigning group composed of individuals also
recruited from the community but provided with additional information about schizophrenia
symptoms and instructed to complete the speech tasks “as if” they were attempting to convince
the examiner that they have schizophrenia. All diagnostic determinations were made by trained
graduate-level psychology students according to DSM-IV criteria (APA, 2000), and confirmed
by consensus meeting with Alex Cohen, Ph.D. Exclusionary criteria included: a) Global
Assessment of Functioning rating below 30, indicating symptom levels that could interfere with
participation in the study, b) documented evidence of mental retardation from the medical
records, c) current or historical DSM-IV diagnosis of alcohol or drug abuse suggestive of severe
physiological symptoms (e.g., delirium tremens, repeated loss of consciousness), and d) history
of significant head trauma (requiring overnight hospitalization).The study was approved by the
appropriate Human Subject Review Boards and all participants provided informed consent prior
to participating in the study.
Schizophrenia group
Schizophrenia patients were recruited from outpatient community mental health
clinics and residential facilities in the Baton Rouge and Lafayette, LA, areas as part of a larger
study. Diagnoses werebased on information obtained from the patients’ medical records and a
structured clinical interview adopted from the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders
(SCID; First, 1996). At the time of testing, all patients were clinically stable and currently in
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treatment under the supervision of a multi-disciplinary team. Patients received $40 for
participation in the larger studyprotocol, which took approximately four hours for each
participant to complete and included administration of the measures described herein, as well as
several other measures administered for additional research purposes. Data from the
schizophrenia group was collected over the time period of December 2010 through July 2012.
Honest control group
Community control participantswere recruited from the Baton Rouge area as part
of a larger study, with the goal of obtaining a control sample as closely matched as possible to
the schizophrenia group on demographic characteristics such as age, ethnicity, education, and
socioeconomic status. In addition to the exclusionary criteria set forth above, control participants
wereinterviewed using the relevant modules of the SCID(First, 1996) to rule out the presence of
any severe mental illnesses (i.e., psychosis, major depressive disorder, or bipolar
disorder).Participants in the honest control group received $40 for participation in the larger
study protocol, which took approximately four hours for each participant to complete and
included administration of the measures described herein, as well as several other measures
administered for additional research purposes. Data from the honest control group was collected
over the time period of April 2010 through July 2012.
Feigning group
Like community control participants, participants in the feigning group were
recruited from the Baton Rouge area. Participants were not excluded if they were current
students of Louisiana State University, although participants were not recruited through the
university’s psychology experiment pool.Participants in the feigning group were interviewed
using the relevant modules of the SCID (First, 1996) to rule out the presence of any severe
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mental illnesses (i.e., psychosis, major depressive disorder, or bipolar disorder). To maintain
parity with the schizophrenia and honest control group participants, who received approximately
$10 per hour for participation in the larger data collection process (which required approximately
four hours to complete), participants in the feigning group received $20 for their participation in
this supplemental component of the study, which requiredapproximately one and a half to two
hours to complete, as it comprised only a subset of the data collection procedures from the larger
study protocol, which included several additional measures administered for other research
purposes. Data from the feigning group was collected over the time period of November 2011
through May 2012.
In addition to the below-described speech task instructions that were given to all
participants, prior to administration of the speech tasks individuals in the feigning group
werealso provided information about schizophrenia symptoms, couched in non-technical terms
(see Appendix A; as excerpted from National Institute of Mental Health, 2009, p. 3-5), which
they were given 10 minutes to review prior to administration of the speech tasks.Additionally,
individuals in this group were provided with the following directions, based on malingering
research methodology suggestions by Rogers(2008d):
“Malingering”refers to the purposeful attempt by individuals to fake a
psychological disorder in order to gain some reward, such as social
security benefits, or avoid something unpleasant, such as criminal
prosecution or incarceration. As such, malingerers pose a significant
unfair burden to society by increasing insurance premiums and utilizing
public funds provided by lawful taxpayers intended to assist the truly
mentally ill, and may even wrongfully evade criminal responsibility for
serious offenses. In light of this burden posed to society by malingering,
special techniques have been developed to distinguish between individuals
who are truly mentally ill and those who are attempting to fake a disorder.
In order to test some potential methods of detecting malingering, we
would like you to complete the following tasks as if you were trying to
convince an examiner that you have schizophrenia, based on the
information about schizophrenia that we have provided to you, as well as
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anyother knowledge you might have about schizophrenia from whatever
source. Please imagine that the consequences of being identified as faking
are very serious (such as receiving a criminal sentence of life in prison or
the death penalty), and try your best to perform in a manner on the
upcoming tasks that would convince an examiner that you truly have
schizophrenia. In doing so, please keep in mind that the test was
developed specifically to indicate whether someone is faking, so your
performance must be believable enough to avoid detection.
Speech Tasks
For each speech task, participants were seated in front of a computer monitor
while wearing a head-mounted microphone, on which they were instructed to focus their
attention, with the research assistant out of view. The experiment was run using Eprime software
version 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, 2002).For all groups, the cognitive load speech task
was presented prior to the affective reactivity speech task, which allowed for examination of
group differences in speech characteristics when responding to the open-ended, affectivelyneutral speech instructions of the cognitive load speech task without prior suggestion or priming
of emotional tone by the subsequently-administered affective reactivity task.
Cognitive load speech task
As adapted from the procedure as set forth in Cohen, et al. (2011) for obtaining
speech samples under variable conditions of cognitive load for analysis using the CANS,
participants were instructed to provide speech samples of neutral topics (hobbies, living
arrangements, food) while completing either a “medium load” cognitive task, a “high load”
cognitive task, or no cognitive task (i.e., the “low load” baseline condition). The
baselinecondition lasted 90 seconds. Each voiced cognitive task condition contained 30 stimulus
items, taking 90 seconds or more to complete, with the first 90 seconds of speech recorded for
analysis of speech variables. Stimulus items comprised six simple visual symbols from a
common computer keyboard (e.g., “@,” “%,” “$”), which were presented consecutively and
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randomly on the computer screen at interstimulus intervals of 2000 milliseconds. Speech
instructions for the voiced conditions were open-ended and broad, which is also consistent with
prior non-affective reactivity-based CDI research (e.g., Docherty, 2005;Docherty, et al., 2003).
Neutral speech topic instructions are included in Appendix B.
Based on Baddeley’s (1992) model of attention, visual stimuli chosen for the
cognitive tasks should divide cognitive resources without directly affecting verbal expression
(except through depleting working memory stores more generally)(Cohen, et al., 2011).
Response instructions differed between the low- and high-load tasks, as indicated below.If no
response choice was made within 2000 milliseconds, an incorrect response was recorded and the
next stimulus item is presented.Prior to the voiced performance trial of each cognitive task,
participants completed4practice trials of each cognitive task. Practice trials consisted of 13
stimulus items each, with the exception of the first of such trials, which provideddetailed
instruction and corrective feedback on 4 stimulus item presentations. Generalized corrective
feedback (i.e., “correct,” “incorrect,” or “too slow”) was provided on all other trials, including
voiced trials.
Medium-load cognitive task. The medium-load condition consisted of a dualchoice continuous performance task, similar to the task used by Melinder and Barch(2003), in
that participants were required to continually monitor presented stimuli in order to respond to
items based on whether they matched or did not match a predetermined target held in memory.
Participants were instructed to press the “a” button on the computer keyboard if the presented
stimulus object was an “*,” and to press the “l” key in response to any other presented stimulus.
High-load cognitive task. The high-load condition consisted of a one-back test,
based on a commonlyused test of attention and working memory(Cohen, et al., 2011).
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Participants were instructed to press the “a” button on the computer keyboard if the presented
stimulus was the same as the object presented just prior to that object.Approximately 25% of the
symbols presented constituted targets pursuant to this criterion. Participants were instructed to
press the “l” key if the presented stimulus was different from the object presented just prior.
Affective reactivity speech task
For the affective reactivity speech task, participants were instructed to recount
memories falling into the following four broad topic domains, as characterized by affective tone
and arousal level: pleasant high-arousal, pleasant low-arousal, unpleasant high-arousal, and
unpleasant low-arousal. General and condition-specific instructions are set forth in Appendix
C.Ninety-second speech samples wereobtained for each topic domain. Order of condition
presentation was randomized.
This format of obtaining affectively-valenced open-ended autobiographical
speech samples has been shown to reveal more meaningful prosody changes among healthy
adults in moving across affective conditions than standardized visual photographic stimuli
(Cohen, et al., 2010). Furthermore, malingerers have been noted often to call attention to
positive symptoms and “overact their part” (Resnick, 1993; Resnick & Knoll, 2008). Allowing
such presentation style to manifest in a free speech context may thus increase the magnitude of
difference between groups on speech performance.
Post-test Assessment
Following administration of the speech tasks, participants in the feigning group
were asked to complete a brief questionnaire about their approach to the speech tasks. For
example, the questionnaire instructed participants to indicate their existing familiarity with
mental illness, the particular symptoms they attempted to feign during the tasks, and to rate on a
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Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 5 (extremely confident) how confident they
were that they had performed the speech tasks in a manner that would successfully convince an
evaluator that they did, in fact, have schizophrenia, as suggested by Rogers(2008d). A copy of
the questionnaire is included herein as Appendix D.
Dependent Variables
Speech variables
CDI. Speech provided in the affective and cognitive load speech tasks were
transcribed and rated according to the CDI protocol set forth in greater detail by Docherty,
Hawkins, et al. (1996). The referential errors measured by the CDI fall into the following 6
categories:
1. Vague references—i.e., words or phrases that are unclear because they are
overinclusive, and their lack of specificity significantly diminishes the meaning of the
communication (e.g., “It seems so, you know, this, that, or the other.”).
2. Confused references—i.e., references, often pronouns, that are unclear because they
could refer to one of at least two alternative referents (e.g., “He stabbed the dude and
I kicked him. I thought he punched him. I thought he was on the ground just acting
like he was hurt.”).
3. Missing information references—i.e., references that assume the listener has prior
information that he or she does not (e.g., “I like to work all right. Some of those
shops were filthy. I liked the bakeries, some of the shops are clean,” (with no prior
mention of any shops or bakeries)).
4. Ambiguous word meanings—i.e., words or phrases used in such a way that its
intended meaning is unclear, not because the wrong word has been chosen, but
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because the word used could have a number of meanings in the current context and
the correct meaning is not obvious (e.g., “He was a man that was pow in a minute.”).
5. Wrong word references—i.e., a seemingly incorrect choice of word or phrase (e.g.,
“We’ve had our qualms about me bowling, but I’ve always won out,” (Does she mean
“quarrels”?)).
6. Structural unclarities—i.e., instances in which meaning is unclear due to a breakdown
or inadequacy of grammatical structure (e.g., “We went to Arizona. We stopped off
lots of towns between Chicago,” (spoken by a person living in Connecticut)).
Total CDI scores were calculated by summing the total number of communication
failures per 100 words (to control for differences in the amount of speech generated). CDI ratings
were made by the author after training to achieve adequate inter-rater reliability (ICC = .75)
using consensus-rated samples from an archival data set maintained in the research lab of Alex
Cohen, Ph.D., Louisiana State University. The author was blind to participant group. The author
was also blind to speech task category, although content of samples from the affective reactivity
task frequently suggested the relevant category. In a single case, a participant who simply
verbalized the name of the key pressed he made during the medium cognitive load
condition,instead of speaking about the topic provided in the task instructions, was excluded
from the CDI analyses so as not to falsely depress the relevant group’s mean CDI scores, as the
CDI score would have otherwise misleadingly been scored as “0” (i.e., indicating no instances of
referential speech error). It was considered that speech behavior of this nature would be more
appropriately captured by the acoustic alogia variables set forth below.
CANS.The Computerized assessment of Affect from Natural Speech protocol was
used to assess the behavioral manifestation of negative symptoms via the measurement of
36

Alogiavariables, which reflect reduction in the quantity of speech; Blunt Affectvariables, which
reflect diminished expression of emotion characterized by reduced vocal inflection and
amplitude variability; and Formant variables, which reflect diminished vocal expression
associated with blunted facial expressivity (Cohen, et al., 2008, 2010, 2013, manuscript in
preparation, see also Covington et al., 2012).
For the present analyses, speech provided in the affective and cognitive load
speech tasks was processed for analysis as follows (Cohen, et al., manuscript in preparation).
Speech samples were digitally recorded at 16 bits per second at a sampling frequency of 44,100
hertz. The digitized recordings were then analyzed using PRAAT (Boersma, 2006), a program
used extensively in speech pathology and linguistic studies. The PRAAT system was used to
organize sound files into “frames” for analysis, which were set at a rate of 100 per second.
MATLAB and Excel Macro functions were employed to compute the variables of interest from
the PRAAT output. Volume and frequency was measured every 10 milliseconds. Next, each
Pause (defined as consecutive assessments with no speech > 10 milliseconds) and Utterance
(defined as consecutive speech > 150 milliseconds) was identified. For each Utterance, means
and standard deviations were measured for volume and frequency. Using these measurements for
each frame, the following variables were calculated:
“Alogia” was examined using the following variables: (i) Total Number of
Pauses, (ii) Mean Pause Length, (iii) Total Number of Utterances, and (iv) Mean Utterance
Length.
“Blunted Affect” was examined using the following variables: (i) Local Emphasis
(i.e., mean standard deviation of volume values); (ii) Global Emphasis (i.e., the standard
deviation of standard deviations of volume values); (iii) Local F0 Inflection (i.e., mean standard
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deviations of fundamental frequency (F0) values); and (iv) Global F0 Inflection (i.e., the
standard deviation of standard deviations of F0 values). For inclusion in these variable
calculations, F0 values were log transformed to account for nonlinear distribution. In order to
control for the fact that increased Utterance length provides greater opportunity to express
variability in speech volume and frequency, each of these Blunted Affect variables was divided
by (log-transformed) Mean Utterance Length (as matched by task condition), then multiplied by
a constant (100) to increase ease of interpretability, given the small size of some resultant
variables.
“Formant Variables,” i.e., aspects of diminished verbal prosody that are
associated with blunted range of oral movement, particularly with regard to vowel expression,
were examined using the following variables: (i) Local F1 Inflection (i.e., mean of standard
deviation of frequency related to vertical tongue movement (F1)); (ii) Global F1 Inflection (i.e.,
the standard deviation of standard deviations of F1 values); (iii) Local F2 Inflection (i.e., mean of
standard deviation of frequency related to horizontal and back/forward tongue movement (F2));
and (iv) Global F2 Inflection (i.e., the standard deviation of standard deviations of F2 values).
Standard deviations in F1 and F2 Inflection have been found to be associated with clinician-rated
severity of negative symptoms (Covington, et al., 2012). For inclusion in these variable
calculations, F1 and F2 values were log transformed to account for nonlinear distribution. In
order to control for the fact that increased Utterance length provides greater opportunity to
express variability in speech frequency, each of these Formant variables was divided by (logtransformed) Mean Utterance Length (as matched by task condition), then multiplied by a
constant (100) to increase ease of interpretability, given the small size of resultant variables.
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Cognitive task performance
Following the procedure set forth by Cohen, et al. (2011), hit rate and false alarms
were calculated for the medium- and high-load cognitive tasks.Sensitivity was operationalized
using d’, which takesinto account both correct hits and false alarms. Increasing scoresreflect
better performance (i.e., higher hit rate, lower false alarmrate). Response bias was
operationalized using the natural log of theβ ratio statistic (“ln(β)”; used in lieu of β to account
for skewed distribution of β) withincreasing scores indicating a more conservative bias (fewer
correctand incorrect responses) and lower scores indicating a moreliberal bias (greater number of
both correct and incorrect responses).
Analyses
Data distribution
First, continuous demographic and dependent variables were examined for
normality of distribution. Variables were then transformed to correct for skew and outlying data
points where necessary, as indicated.
Demographic variables
Next, the three groups were compared on demographic variables obtained during
the diagnostic screening interview (e.g., age, ethnicity, gender, education, and parents’ education
level as an approximation of socioeconomic status unrelated to schizophrenia-specific
educational or occupational functioning deficits). Age, ethnicity, and gender were also examined
as potential confounding variables to statistically control for in the primary analyses. All tests
were two-tailed.
Participant and parental educational variables were not examined for inclusion as
covariates in the primary analyses, as cognitive resources (or effortful attempt to feign deficits in
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such resources) are theoretically related to performance during the speech tasks (including verbal
performance (Cohen et al., 2011; Melinder & Barch, 2003)), andboth patient and parental
educational attainment are related to psychiatric status (e.g., Byrne, Agerbo, Eaton, &
Mortensen, 2004; Chong, et al. 2009). Therefore, participant and parental educational variables
might draw meaningful variance from the analyses if included therein.
Primary analyses
Each hypothesis was then tested by a series of mixed model ANOVAs (group (3)
X cognitive (3) or affective load (4) condition)—looking primarily for (a) main effect of group,
and (b) the group by condition interaction (i.e., differences in group patterns in the dependent
variables across low and high cognitive or affective load). The Greenhouse-Geisser correction
was used where lack of sphericity was indicated. Where multiple ANOVAs were run within a
single family of variables, Bonferroni-corrected α-levels of .0125 (i.e., acoustic analysis sets for
the Alogia, Blunt Affect, and Formant variables)or .025 (for cognitive task performance
variables) were applied for main effects. Significant main effects were examined via Tukey tests
where no covariates were included in the model, and via Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests for
models including covariates. Significant interactions were examined using post-hoc simpleeffects analysis, utilizing a series of one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs (or dependentmeasures t-test for cognitive performance variables) for each group, across conditions (applying
a Bonferroni-corrected α level of .017 to account for multiple group analyses). All tests were
two-tailed.
Feigning group post-task questionnaire
Feigning group participants’ self-reported task strategies and confidence in
feigning ability were also explored via post-hoc analysis. All tests were two-tailed.
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Power Analysis
Power analyses for the primary analyses were conducted using G*Power software
3.1.2 (Buchner, 2009). Because neither effect sizes nor correlation of dependent variables
among within-group conditions have yet been established by existing literature for the groups to
be examined herein, ranges of required sample sizes necessary to achieve statistical significance
were calculated for each ANOVA using α = .05, power = .80, a range of both small (f = .25) and
large (f = .40) effect sizes, and a range of both small (r = .10) and large (r = .75) correlations
among repeated measures. For the mixed model ANOVAs to be performed comparing the
groups on the dependent variables in the affective load task (groups = 3, number of
measurements = 4), power analysis indicated necessary minimum sample sizes ranging from 24
(using f = .40; r = .10) to 129 (using f = .25; r = .75) total participants to detect differences in
between-subject factors, and minimum sample sizes ranging from 9 (using f = .40; r = .75) to 54
(using f = .25; r = .10) total participants to detect a group by condition interaction. For the mixed
model ANOVAs to be performed comparing the groups on the dependent variables in the
cognitive load task (groups = 3, number of measurements = 3), power analysis indicated
necessary minimum sample sizes ranging from 30 (using f = .40; r = .10) to 132 (using f = .25; r
= .75) total participants to detect differences in between-subject factors, and minimum sample
sizes ranging from 9 (using f = .40; r = .75) to 54 (using f = .25; r = .10) total participants to
detect an interaction. Note that power analysis for main effects of condition was not computed,
as it was anticipated that main effects of condition would be masked and/or rendered irrelevant
by the more important group by condition interaction for each ANOVA. Furthermore, main
effects of condition, alone, were not relevant to the purpose of the study, i.e., detection of
feigning behavior.
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This study achieved an actual total samples size of 121 (schizophrenia group n =
52, control group n = 31, feigning group n = 40), falling on the higher side of the various ranges
of suggested sample size. All 121 participants were used in the cognitive task performance
analyses. However, due to quality issues with a small percentage of audio recordings, total
samples sizes ranged from 102 – 105 for CDI analyses, and from 103 – 108 for CANS analyses.
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RESULTS
Data Distribution
Continuous demographic and dependent variables were examined for normality of
distribution. All continuous demographic variables (age, education, father’s education, and
mother’s education) were normally distributed (skew values < .34, kurtosis values < 1.43). F0,
F1, and F2 values were log-transformed to account for nonlinear distribution. CDI, Mean Pause
Length, and Mean Utterance Length were also log-transformed to correct for positive skew
(skew values > 2.00). Following transformations, scores of 13 participants (6 from the
schizophrenia group, 6 from the feigning group, and 1 control) across 20 individual data points
(out of 95 individualdependent variables) remained as significant outliers (data points with zscores > 3.29, as defined by Field (2005)). These outliers were replaced with scores equal to zscore values of 3.29 (Field, 2005). Following this procedure, all transformed dependent variables
were normally distributed (skew values < 1.42, kurtosis values < 1.55).
Demographic Variables
Group demographic differences, examined using Pearson’s Chi-square analysis
for categorical dependent variables and one-way ANOVAs for continuous dependent variables,
are set forth in Table 1. Significant main effects of group were further exploredby either
examining the standardized residuals’ significance across cells (for Chi-square analysis) or
byusing post-hoc Tukey tests (for ANOVAs). The schizophrenia group contained significantly
more male participants than both the control and feigning groups(ps< .05); the gender
distribution of the control and feigning groups did not significantly differ. Overall differences in
ethnicity distribution across groups were significant, but post-hoc group comparison did not
reveal significant differences. Participants in the feigning group were significantly younger than
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Table 1: Group Demographic Differences

N

Control

Feigning

Schizophrenia

30

36

41

Gender (%)

Test Statistica

14.07***

% Maleb

45%

31%

67%

% Female

55%

69%

27%

Ethnicity (%)c

7.42*

% Caucasian

48%

79%

60%

% African American

48%

21%

40%

% Hispanic/Latino

4%

0%

0%

Age (M ± SD)d

40.68 ± 12.61

29.23 ± 10.71

41.63 ± 11.56

14.43***

Education Level (M ± SD)e

14.25 ± 2.34

15.13 ± 2.22

11.96 ± 1.96

27.59***

Father’s Education (M ± SD)f

12.29 ± 3.70

15.27 ± 3.06

13.24 ± 4.32

5.42**

Mother’s Education (M ± SD)g

13.79 ± 2.67

15.08 ± 2.59

12.42 ± 2.96

7.14**

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
a
Pearson’s Chi-square analysis used to examine gender and ethnicity (χ2values provided);
ANOVA used to examine age and education variables (F values provided).
b
Schizophrenia > control = feigning
c
Due to lack of sufficient variability across the ethnicity variable, the African American and
Hispanic/Latino categories were combined to form a single category, and an Chi-square analysis
was performed using a dichotomous outcome variable (Caucasian v. non-Caucasian).
d
Feigning < schizophrenia = control
e
Schizophrenia < control = feigning
f
Feigning > control
g
Feigning > schizophrenia
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both the control and schizophrenia participants (ps < .001); but age of control and schizophrenia
participants did not significantly differ (p = .93). The schizophrenia group reported lower
educational attainment than both the control and feigning groups (ps < .001), who did not
significantly differ from one another in educational attainment (p = .39). Participants in the
feigning group reported significantly higher paternal educational attainment than the control
group, and significantly higher maternal educational attainment than the schizophrenia group (ps
< .01); no other group differences in parental education were significant (ps > .10).
Gender was examined using independent samples t-tests. Gender was
significantly associated with CDI scores in the unpleasant/low arousal condition (t = -3.11, p<
.01), with men (M = .52, SD = .32) having higher CDI scores than women (M =.33, SD = .30).
Gender was also significantly associated with Total Number of Pauses and Mean Pause Length
across all task conditions (ts > -2.04, ps < .05), except for Total Number of Pauses in
unpleasant/high arousal affective reactivity task condition, in which gender demonstrated
difference at a trend level (t = 1.09, p = .06). Women (range of means (Ms) = 157.21 – 198.33,
range of standard deviations (SDs) = 53.43 – 5.04) made more pauses during the speech tasks
than men (Ms = 131.26 – 175.96, SDs = 52.10 – 60.46); while men (Ms = 2.58 – 2.78, SDs =
.21– .27) took longer pauses than women (M = 2.48 – 2.65, SDs = .18 – .21). There were also
significant gender differences in F0 Local and Global Inflection across all task conditions (ts >
4.23, ps < .001), with women (M = 1.27 – 1.86, SDs = .40 – .75) using more F0 Local and
Global Inflection in their speech than men (Ms = .88 – 1.28, SDs = .41 – .52). Women (Ms =
1.82 – 1.88, SDs = .77 – .92) expressed significantly more F1 Global Inflection than men(Ms =
2.27 – 2.32, SDs = .96 – 1.02) across all conditions in the affective reactivity task (ts > 2.31, ps <
.03), except the pleasant/low arousal condition, in which women used more F1 Global
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Inflection than men (M = 2.18, SD = .89) at a trend level (t= -1.93, p = .06). There were no other
significant gender differences across any remaining dependent variables (ts < 1.90, ps > .06). In
summary, gender was not significantly associated with any of the cognitive performance
dependent variables. It was, however, associated with CDI scores in the affective reactivity task.
It was also associated with several acoustic analysis variables spanning Alogia, Blunt Affect, and
Formant categories—there were gender differences across both cognitive load and affective
reactivity tasks for Total Number of Pauses, Mean Pause Length, and Local and Global F0
Inflection; as well as gender differences in F1 Global Inflection in the affective reactivity task.
Ethnicity was also examined using independent samples t-tests (using Caucasian
v. African American groups, due to lack of adequate distribution of participants among other
ethnic groups). Ethnicity was significantly associated with CDI scores in the unpleasant/high
arousal affective reactivity tasks condition (t = -2.40, p = .02), with African-American
participants having higher CDI scores (M = .57, SD = .36) than Caucasians (M = .41, SD = .30).
African Americans (M = .46, SD = .35) also demonstrated higher CDI scores than Caucasians (M
= .35, SD = .29) in the pleasant/low arousal affective reactivity condition at a trend level (t = 1.68, p = .10). Ethnicity was significantly associated with Global F0 Inflection in the low
cognitive load condition (t = 2.30, p = .02), with Caucasian participants using more Global F0
Inflection (M = 1.16, SD = .46) than African Americans (M = .95, SD = .44). African Americans
(Ms = 2.72 – 2.82, SDs = .81 – .97) used more Local F2 Inflection than Caucasians (Ms = 2.37 –
2.44, SDs = .76 – .83) across all conditions of the affective reactivity task (ts > -2.04, ps < .05),
with the exception of the unpleasant/high arousal condition, in which African Americans (M =
2.75, SD = .81) used more Local F2 Inflection than Caucasians (M = 2.47, SD = .80) at trend
level (t = -1.79, p = .08). African Americans (Ms = 2.66 – 2.69, SDs = .77 – .91) also used more
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Local F2 Inflection than Caucasians (Ms = 2.39 – 2.40, SDs = .68 – .78) in the medium and high
cognitive load conditions at a trend level (ts > -1.84, ps < .09). African Americans (M = 1.17,
SD = .55) used significantly more Global F2 Inflection than Caucasians (M = .94, SD = .53) in
the medium cognitive load condition (t = -2.16, p = .03), and African Americans (Ms = 1.13 –
1.16, SDs = .56) used more Global F2 Inflection than Caucasians (Ms = .92 – .95, SDs = .56 –
.58) in the low cognitive load and unpleasant/low arousal affective reactivity conditions (ts >1.82, ps < .08). There were no other significant ethnicity differences across any remaining
dependent variables (ts < 1.60, ps > .12). In summary, ethnicity was not significantly associated
with any of the cognitive performance dependent variables. It was, however, associated with CDI
scores in the affective reactivity task. It was also associated with several acoustic analysis
variables spanning Blunt Affect and Formant categories—there were differences among different
ethnic groups in Local and Global F2 Inflection across both cognitive load and affective
reactivity tasks; and there were differences among different ethnic groups in Global F0 Inflection
in the cognitive load condition.
Age was examined using Pearson’s correlations. Age was significantly inversely
correlated with Mean Pause Length in the low cognitive load condition (r = -.22, p = .02), and in
the affective reactivity task across the pleasant/low arousal, pleasant/high arousal, and
unpleasant/low arousal conditions (rs > -.20, ps = .05). It was also inversely correlated with
Mean Pause Length in the unpleasant/high arousal condition at a trend level (r = -.17, p = .07).
Age was significantly inversely correlated with Global F0 Inflection across all task conditions (rs
> -.19, ps < .05), except the unpleasant/high arousal condition, in which it was inversely
correlated with Global F0 Inflection at a trend level (r = -.17, p = .07). Age was significantly
correlated with Global F1 Inflection in the medium cognitive load condition (r = .19, p = .05)
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and the pleasant/high arousal affective reactivity condition (r = .20, p = .04). Age was
significantly correlated with Local and Global F2 Inflection across all task conditions (rs > .29,
ps < .01). Age was also significantly correlated with d’ scores in the medium cognitive load
condition (r = .20, p = .03). Age was not significantly correlated with any other remaining
dependent variables (rs < .17, ps > .08). In summary, age was not significantly correlated with
any of the CDI variables. It was, however, associated with d’ scores in the cognitive load task,
and several acoustic variables across Alogia, Blunt Affect, and Formant categories. Age was
associated with Mean Pause Length, Global F0 and F1 Inflection, and Local and Global F2
Inflection in both the cognitive load and affective reactivity tasks, and with Local F1 Inflection
in the cognitive load task.
Based on the above analyses, (a) gender was entered as a covariate for (i) all
analyses examining Total Number of Pauses, Mean Pause Length, Local F0 Inflection, and
Global F0 Inflection, and (ii) affective reactivity task analyses examining CDI scores and Global
F1 Inflection; (b) ethnicity was entered as a covariate for (i) all analyses examining Local and
Global F2 Inflection, (ii) the cognitive load task analysis examining Global F0 Inflection, and
(iii) and the affective reactivity task analysis examining CDI scores; and (c) age was entered as a
covariate for (i) all analyses examining Mean Pause Length, Global F0 Inflection, Global F1
Inflection, Local F2 Inflection, and Global F2 Inflection, and (ii) the cognitive load task analysis
examiningd’.
Primary Analyses
Affective Reactivity Speech Task
A summary of significant results for the affective reactivity task is set forth in
Table 2.

48

Table 2: Summary of significant affective reactivity task condition results
Affective Reactivity Task
Significant Effectsa

Dependent variables (by category)
Group
CDI

Condition

Interaction

S>F=C

Alogia
Total Number of Pauses

C>S=F

Mean Pause Length

F=S>C

Total Number of Utterances
Mean Utterance Length
Blunt Affect
Local Emphasis
Global Emphasis
Local F0 Inflection
Global F0 Inflection
Formant
Local F1 Inflection
Global F1 Inflection

S>F

Local F2 Inflection

C>S>F

Global F2 Inflection

C=S>F

C: P/ha > U/la = U/hab

a

C = control group, S = schizophrenia group, F = feigning group, P/ha = pleasant/high arousal
condition, U/ha = unpleasant/high arousal condition, U/la = unpleasant/low arousal condition
b
This effect was not robust to Bonferroni-correction for family-wise error.

CDI. Affective reactivity speech task means and standard deviations for CDI
variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 3. Note, to aid interpretability, non-transformed
CDI scores (i.e., number of speech errors made per 100 words generated) are provided.

49

Table 3: Means (± standard deviations) for CDI variables across groups, for affective reactivity
task conditions
CDI
Control
Feigning
Schizophrenia
Pleasant/Low-arousal

1.01 (1.24)

1.69 (2.25)

3.92 (5.01)

Pleasant/High-arousal

1.76 (1.92)

1.28 (1.50)

3.81 (3.97)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

1.49 (1.30)

2.14 (3.64)

3.93 (4.43)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

2.25 (2.30)

1.80 (1.89)

4.54 (4.29)

Results for the ANOVA examining CDI scores across groups and affective load
condition, controlling for gender and ethnicity, are set forth in Table 4. There was a significant
main effect for group, but the main effect of affective condition and the group by condition
interaction were nonsignificant. Tukey post-hoc tests examining the main effect of group
revealed that the schizophrenia group evidenced significantly more speech disorganization than
both the control and feigning groups across conditions (ps < .001); but the feigning and control
groups were not significantly different from one another (p = 1.00). See Figure 1.

Table 4: ANOVA comparing groups on CDI scores, across affective reactivity task conditions
(controlling for gender and ethnicity)
df

F

ηρ²

p

Group

2, 100

12.50

.20

< .001a

Condition

3, 300

1.52

.02

.21

1.43

.03

.20

Group * Condition
a

6, 300
Schizophrenia > feigning = control
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0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4

Control

0.3

Feigning

0.2

Schizophrenia

0.1
0
Low-arousal

High-arousal

Low-arousal

Pleasant

High-arousal

Unplesant

Figure 1: Log transformed CDI scores across affective reactivity conditions

Alogia.Affective reactivity speech task means and standard deviations for Alogia
variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 5. Note, to aid interpretability, non-transformed
Pause and Utterance scores are provided.
Results for ANOVAs examining Alogia variables across affective reactivity
conditions are set forth in Table 6. For Total Number of Pauses (controlling for gender) and
Mean Pause Length (controlling for gender and age), there were significant effects for group, but
no significant main effects of condition or interactions. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise
comparisons revealed that the control group used significantly more pauses, with a shorter mean
pause length, than either the schizophrenia (p< .01) or feigning groups (p< .01), who were not
significantly different from one another (p = 1.00). There were no significant main effects or
interactions for either Total Number of Utterances or Total Utterance Length. See Figure 2.
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Table 5: Means (± standard deviations) for Alogia variables across groups, for affective
reactivity task conditions
Alogia

Control

Feigning

Schizophrenia

Pleasant/Low-arousal

204.74 (44.12)

157.72 (58.48)

157.38 (45.55)

Pleasant/High-arousal

220.32 (51.04)

177.31 (62.47)

165.93 (51.62)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

214.37 (52.98)

167.25 (59.18)

166.29 (48.47)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

222.35 (48.15)

174.64 (64.86)

169.45 (47.62)

Pleasant/Low-arousal

302.55 (119.94)

489.69 (250.74)

482.14 (276.91)

Pleasant/High-arousal

273.16 (113.39)

409.47 (223.20)

464.74 (270.81)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

302.50 (131.88)

459.28 (234.30)

455.71 (257.45)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

278.16 (105.98)

442.96 (294.25)

443.00 (285.45)

Pleasant/Low-arousal

72.77 (17.07)

59.56 (15.58)

65.93 (19.94)

Pleasant/High-arousal

66.97 (18.10)

60.22 (18.41)

64.33 (16.98)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

70.23 (17.28)

62.81 (18.46)

65.38 (17.67)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

68.74 (4.73)

62.58 (20.15)

63.50 (16.40)

Pleasant/Low-arousal

1431.48 (364.23)

1758.56 (550.07)

1641.29 (549.75)

Pleasant/High-arousal

1564.58 (415.20)

1767.45 (554.71)

1651.40 (512.38)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

1481.97 (374.96)

1678.84 (493.30)

1602.67 (441.04)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

1490.00 (313.37)

1715.83 (542.89)

1679.83 (573.64)

Total Number of Pauses

Mean Pause Length

Total Number of Utterances

Mean Utterance Length
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Table 6: ANOVAs comparing groups on Alogia variables, across affective reactivity task
conditions
Alogia

df

F

ηρ²

p

Total Number of Pauses
(controlling for gender)
Group

2, 103

.82

.16

< .001a

Condition

3, 309

1.11

.01

.35

Group * Condition

6, 309

.52

.01

.80

Mean Pause Length
(controlling for gender and age)
Group

2, 102

7.99

.14

.001b

3, 306

.18

.00

.91

6, 306

1.13

.02

.35

Group

2, 105

2.09

.04

.13

Condition

3, 315

1.14

.01

.23

Group * Condition

6, 315

1.13

.02

.35

Group

2, 105

2.28

.04

.11

Condition

3, 315

1.37

.01

.25

.64

.01

.53

Condition
Group * Condition
Total Number of Utterances

Mean Utterance Length

Group * Condition
6, 315
Control > schizophrenia = feigning
b
Schizophrenia = feigning > control
a

In summary, the control group used significantly more pauses, with a shorter
mean pause length, than either the schizophrenia or feigning groups. In other words, the feigning
group successfully resembled the schizophrenia group in its use of longer (and conversely fewer
overall) pauses. Notably, the main effects of group for Total Pause Number (p< .001) and Mean
Pause Length (p = .001) were robust to application of a Bonferroni-correction for family-wise
error within the Alogia analysis set.
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Figure 2: Alogia scores across affective reactivity conditions
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Schizophrenia

Blunt Affect.Affective reactivity speech task means and standard deviations for
Blunt Affect variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 7. Emphasis and Inflection scores are
provided as log-transformed and corrected for Mean Utterance Length.

Table 7: Means (± standard deviations) for Blunt Affect variables across groups, for affective
reactivity task conditions
Blunt Affect

Control

Feigning

Schizophrenia

Pleasant/Low-arousal

252.96 (44.21)

266.99 (72.12)

256.94 (49.21)

Pleasant/High-arousal

261.19 (42.26)

269.06 (75.42)

261.24 (47.06)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

261.27 (45.26)

263.60 (71.94)

254.45 (55.22)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

257.43 (40.73)

270.01 (68.87)

258.93 (49.52)

Pleasant/Low-arousal

80.86 (18.51)

86.61 (23.49)

87.86 (20.30)

Pleasant/High-arousal

87.06 (19.78)

86.91 (27.76)

87.59 (25.86)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

84.37 (19.88)

89.64 (27.25)

88.56 (24.52)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

89.56 (17.49)

86.96 (23.94)

85.28 (22.29)

Pleasant/Low-arousal

1.61 (.77)

1.62 (.74)

1.30 (.63)

Pleasant/High-arousal

1.64 (.52)

1.59 (.57)

1.38 (.64)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

1.66 (.79)

1.58 (.61)

1.31 (.56)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

1.67 (.56)

1.68 (.66)

1.44 (.69)

Pleasant/Low-arousal

1.19 (.45)

1.22 (.45)

.93 (.51)

Pleasant/High-arousal

1.16 (.50)

1.17 (.44)

.98 (.51)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

1.17 (.53)

1.21 (.39)

.97 (.51)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

1.19 (.43)

1.18 (.44)

.96 (.50)

Local Emphasis

Global Emphasis

Local F0 Inflection

Global F0 Inflection
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Results for ANOVAs examining Blunt Affect variables across affective reactivity
conditions are set forth in Table 8. There were no significant main effects or interactions for
Local or Global Emphasis, or Local (controlling for gender) or Global F0 (controlling for gender
and age) Inflection. See Figure 3.

Table 8: ANOVAs comparing groups on Blunt Affect variables, across affective reactivity task
conditions
Blunt Affect

df

F

ηρ²

p

Local Emphasis
Group

2, 105

.38

.01

.69

Condition

3, 315

1.02

.01

.39

Group * Condition

6, 315

.62

.01

.71

Group

2, 105

.13

.00

.88

Condition

2.74, 287.23

.40

.00

.73

5.47, 287.23

.76

.01

.59

2, 103

.96

.02

.39

Condition

3, 309

1.10

.01

.35

Group * Condition

6, 309

.32

.01

.93

Global F0 Inflection
(controlling for gender and age)
Group

2, 102

1.15

.03

.24

Condition

3, 306

.43

.00

.73

Group * Condition

6, 306

.13

.00

.99

Global Emphasis

Group * Condition
Local F0 Inflection
(controlling for gender)
Group
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Figure 3: Log transformed and corrected Blunt Affect scores across affective reactivity conditions
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Formant variables.Affective reactivity speech task means and standard
deviations for Formant variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 9. Inflection scores are
provided as log-transformed and corrected for Mean Utterance Length.

Table 9: Means (± standard deviations) for Formant variables across groups, for affective
reactivity task conditions
Formant

Control

Feigning

Schizophrenia

Pleasant/Low-arousal

4.39 (1.05)

4.23 (2.28)

4.74 (1.56)

Pleasant/High-arousal

4.42 (.86)

4.45 (2.26)

4.74 (1.81)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

4.39 (1.10)

4.24(2.31)

4.80 (1.65)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

4.40 (1.01)

4.51 (2.26)

4.92 (1.48)

Pleasant/Low-arousal

2.02 (.63)

1.67 (1.01)

2.30(.98)

Pleasant/High-arousal

1.99 (.73)

1.79 (1.08)

2.32 (.88)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

1.99 (.56)

1.79 (1.19)

2.45 (.96)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

2.05 (.78)

1.84 (1.08)

2.29 (.81)

Pleasant/Low-arousal

3.08 (.72)

1.92 (.49)

2.68 (.87)

Pleasant/High-arousal

3.26 (.68)

1.95 (.49)

2.63 (.94)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

3.03 (.62)

1.94 (.55)

2.62 (.83)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

3.02 (.70)

1.95 (.47)

2.79 (.75)

Pleasant/Low-arousal

1.40 (.44)

.54 (.42)

1.22 (.57)

Pleasant/High-arousal

1.35 (.40)

.51 (.30)

1.13 (.50)

Unpleasant/Low-arousal

1.31 (.41)

.53 (.41)

1.18 (.53)

Unpleasant/High-arousal

1.36 (.41)

.51 (.38)

1.22 (.50)

Local F1 Inflection

Global F1 Inflection

Local F2 Inflection

Global F2 Inflection
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Results for ANOVAs examining Formant variables across affective reactivity
conditions are set forth in Table 10. There were no significant main effects or interaction for
Local F1 Inflection(controlling for gender and age). For Global F1 Inflection there was a
significant main effect of group, but no significant main effect of condition or interaction. Posthoc Tukey tests revealed that the feigning group used significantly less Global F1 Inflection than
the schizophrenia group (p< .01); but the control group was not significantly different from
either other group (ps > .17). See Figure 4.
For Local F2 Inflection (controlling for ethnicity and age), there was a significant
main effect of group and a significant group by condition interaction. Bonferroni-corrected posthoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that all three groups were significantly different from one
another, with the feigning group using less Local F2 Inflection than both the schizophrenia and
control groups (ps < .001), and the schizophrenia group using less Local F2 Inflection than the
control group (p = .03). With regard to the interaction effect, post-hoc simple-effects analysis
revealed a significant effect of condition within the control group (F (3, 87) = 3.91, ηρ² = .12, p =
.01), which remained significant after application of Bonferroni correction; with Bonferronicorrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons indicating that control participants used more Local F2
Inflection in the pleasant/high arousal condition than both the unpleasant/low arousal (p = .03)
and unpleasant/high arousal (p = .05) conditions (ps for all other pairwise comparisons > .55).
The main effect of condition was not significant within the feigning (F (2.43, 84.97) = .22, ηρ² =
.01, p = .84) or schizophrenia (F (2.02, 82.78) = 1.56, ηρ² = .04, p = .22) groups. See Figure 4.

59

Table 10: ANOVAs comparing groups on Formant variables, across affective reactivity task
conditions
Formant variables

df

F

ηρ²

p

Local F1 Inflection
(controlling for gender and age)
Group

2, 102

.54

.01

.59

Condition

2.78, 283.02

1.92

.02

.13

Group * Condition

5.55, 283.02

1.51

.03

.18

Group

2, 105

5.25

.09

.01a

Condition

3, 315

.34

.00

.80

6, 315

.68

.01

.67

2, 103

20.23

.28

<.001b

Condition

2.62, 269.49

1.14

.01

.33

Group * Condition

5.23, 269.49

2.29

.04

.04c

2, 103

28.18

.36

<.001d

2.75, 282.95

1.23

.01

.29

Global F1 Inflection

Group * Condition
Local F2 Inflection
(controlling for ethnicity and age)
Group

Global F2 Inflection
(controlling for ethnicity and age)
Group
Condition

Group * Condition
5.49, 282.95
.71
.01
.63
Schizophrenia > feigning
b
Control > schizophrenia > feigning
c
Control group: pleasant/high arousal > unpleasant/low arousal = unpleasant/high arousal (Note:
this effect was not robust to family-wise Bonferroni-correction.)
d
Schizophrenia = control > feigning
a

For Global F2 Inflection (controlling for ethnicity and age), the main effect of
group was significant, but not the main effect of condition or the interaction. Bonferronicorrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that the feigning group used significantly less
Global F2 Inflection than the schizophrenia and control groups (ps < .001); but schizophrenia
and control groups did not significantly differ from one another (p = .36). See Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Corrected and log-transformed Formant variable scores across affective reactivity conditions
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In summary, the feigning group used less F1 Global, F2 Local, and F2 Global
Inflection than the schizophrenia group. In other words, the feigning group tended to use poor
formant inflection (less tongue movement-based articulation) in attempt to mimic schizophrenia
symptoms. Notably, all three of these main group effects were robust to application of
Bonferroni correction to account for potential family-wise error within the Formant variable
set(F1 Global Inflection group effect p = .007, F2 Local and Global Inflection group effect ps <
.001). The feigning group’s strategy distinguished it from the control group for F2 Local and
Global Inflection, in a direction matching that distinguishing the schizophrenia group from the
control group with regard to Local F2 Inflection (i.e., the schizophrenia group also used less
Local F2 Inflection than controls). However, the feigning group over-exaggerated this effect,
using significantly less F1 Global, F2 Local, and F2 Global Inflection than even the
schizophrenia group. Furthermore, even though the control group demonstrated slight affective
reactivity for Local F2 Inflection in the pleasant/high arousal condition, the feigning group
appeared to remain steady across affective conditions. However, this interaction effect (p = .04)
was not robust to Bonferroni-correction for family-wise error.
Cognitive load speech task
A summary of significant results for the cognitive load task is set forth in
Table 11.
CDI.Cognitive load speech task means and standard deviations for CDI variables,
across groups, are set forth in Table 12. Note, to aid interpretability, non-transformed CDI scores
(i.e., number of speech errors made per 100 words generated) are provided.
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Table 11: Summary of significant cognitive load task condition results
Significant Effectsa

Dependent variables (by category)
Group

Condition

CDI

Interactions

l>h

Alogia
l > m > hb

C: l = m> h
F: l > m = h
S: l > m = h

C>S

l>h

S: l > m = h

S>C

h>l

S: h > lb

S: l > h
C: l > h

Total Number of Pauses

C>S=F

Mean Pause Length

F=S>C

Total Number of Utterances
Mean Utterance Length
Blunt Affect
Local Emphasis
Global Emphasis
Local F0 Inflection
Global F0 Inflection

C > Sb

Formant
Local F1 Inflection
Global F1 Inflection
Local F2 Inflection

C>S>F

Global F2 Inflection

C>S>F

Cognitive Performance
d’

C>S>F

m>h

ln(β)

C=S>F

m > hb

a

C = control group, S = schizophrenia group, F = feigning group, l = low cognitive load
condition, m = medium cognitive load condition, h = high cognitive load condition
b
This effect was not robust to Bonferroni-correction for family-wise error.
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Table 12: Means (± standard deviations) for CDI variables across groups, for cognitive load task
conditions
Control

Feigning

Schizophrenia

Low Load

1.02 (1.73)

1.88 (3.23)

3.13 (3.60)

Medium Load

.85 (1.02)

1.58 (3.12)

3.50 (13.11)

High Load

1.04 (1.20)

1.48 (3.20)

1.37 (1.89)

CDI

Results for the ANOVA examining CDI scores across groups and cognitive load
conditions are set forth in Table 13. There was no significant main effect of group, but there was
a significant main effect for cognitive load condition. The group by cognitive load condition
interaction was not significant. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons examining
the main effect of cognitive load condition revealed significantly more speech disorganization in
the low cognitive load condition than the high load condition (p = .01). The medium load
condition was not significantly different from the high load condition (p = 1.0), but differed from
the low load condition at a trend level (p = .10). See Figure 5.

Table 13: ANOVA comparing groups on CDI scores, across cognitive load task conditions
df

F

ηρ²

P

Group

2, 99

1.67

.03

.19

Condition

1.80, 11.91

4.04

.04

.02a

1.91

.04

.11

Group * Condition
a

3.77, 186.65
low > high load condition
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Figure 5: Log-transformed CDI scores across cognitive load conditions

Alogia. Cognitive load speech task means and standard deviations for Alogia
variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 14. Note, to aid interpretability, non-transformed
pause and utterance scores are provided.
Results for ANOVAs examining Alogia variables across cognitive load
conditions are set forth in Table 15. For Total Pause Number (controlling for gender), there were
significant main effects for group and condition, as well as a significant group by condition
interaction. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that the control group
used significantly more pauses than either the feigning (p< .01) or schizophrenia (p< .001)
groups; but the feigning and schizophrenia groups were not significantly different from one
another (p = 1.00). In addition, participants used significantly more pauses in the low cognitive
load condition than either other condition (ps < .001), and more pauses in the medium cognitive
load condition than the low cognitive load condition (p< .001). With regard to the interaction
effect, post-hoc simple-effects analysis revealed a significant effect of condition within the
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Table 14: Means (± standard deviations) for Alogia variables across groups, for cognitive load
task conditions
Alogia

Control

Feigning

Schizophrenia

Low Load

209.20 (54.51)

170.28 (63.04)

158.95 (51.35)

Medium Load

198.17 (48.43)

144.77 (50.71)

134.14 (52.71)

High Load

167.77 (48.05)

153.63 (61.39)

116.88 (45.14)

Low Load

316.33 (128.05)

454.03 (272.32)

504.19 (382.26)

Medium Load

346.66 (139.49)

575.81 (313.85)

755.62 (749.33)

High Load

459.97 (209.05)

548.69 (292.48)

790.40 (556.23)

Low Load

71.03 (18.60)

63.94 (19.20)

62.74 (18.93)

Medium Load

71.38 (16.71)

59.40 (17.86)

58.79 (20.15)

High Load

67.13 (18.60)

62.86 (21.90)

51.29 (19.09)

Low Load

1483.73 (408.23)

1703.95 (652.71)

1751.02 (694.51)

Medium Load

1452.83 (352.25)

1808.97 (655.21)

1910.81 (865.72)

High Load

1580.80 (487.89)

1735.97 (579.79)

2235.02 (1106.64)

Total Number of Pauses

Mean Pause Length

Total Number of Utterances

Mean Utterance Length

control group (F (2, 56) = 33.41, ηρ² = .54, p< .001), which remained robust to application of the
Bonferroni correction; with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise-comparisons revealing that
the control group used significantly fewer pauses in the high cognitive load condition than both
the low and medium load conditions (ps < .001), but the low and medium load conditions were
not significantly different from one another (p = .08). Within the feigning group, there was a
significant effect of condition (F (1.60, 52.71) = 5.39, ηρ² = .14, p = .01),which remained robust
to application of Bonferroni correction; with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise-
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comparisons revealing that the feigning group used significantly more pauses in the low
cognitive load condition than both the medium (p = .01) and high (p = .03) cognitive load
conditions, but the medium and high cognitive load conditions were not significantly different
from one another (p = 1.00). Within the schizophrenia group, there was a significant main effect
of condition (F (2, 82) = 16.24, ηρ² = .28, p< .001), which remained robust to application
Bonferroni correction, with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise-comparisons revealing that
the schizophrenia group used significantly more pauses in the low cognitive load condition than
both the medium (p = .01) and high (p< .001) cognitive load conditions, but the medium and
high cognitive load conditions were not significantly different from one another (p = .06). See
Figure 6.
For Mean Pause Length (controlling for gender and age), there was a significant
main effect of group, but no significant main effect of condition or interaction. Bonferronicorrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that the mean length of pauses for the control
group was shorter than that of either the schizophrenia (p< .001) or feigning (p = .04) groups, but
the schizophrenia and feigning groups did not differ from one another (p = .92). See Figure 6.
For Total Number of Utterances, there were significant main effects of group and
condition, as well as a significant interaction. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that the
schizophrenia group made significantly fewer utterances than the control group (p = .01), but the
feigning group did not significantly differ from either other group (ps > .15). Bonferronicorrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that there were more utterances made during
the low than the high cognitive load conditions (p < .001), but the medium load condition was
not significantly different from either other condition (ps > .12). With regard to the interaction
effect, post-hoc simple-effects analysis revealed a significant effect of condition within the
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Table 15: ANOVAs comparing groups on Alogia variables, across cognitive load task conditions
Alogia

df

F

ηρ²

p

Total Pause Number
(controlling for gender)
Group

2, 100

9.90

.17

<.001a

Condition

2, 200

4.10

.04

.02b

Group * Condition

4, 200

3.79

.07

.01c

Mean Pause Length
(controlling for gender and age)
Group

2, 99

8.17

.14

.001d

1.82, 180.08

.19

.00

.81

3.64, 180.08

1.79

.04

.14

2, 102

4.62

.08

.01e

Condition

2, 204

7.06

.07

.001f

Group * Condition

4, 204

3.74

.07

.01g

2, 102

4.46

.10

.01h

1.77, 180.54

6.27

.06

< .01i

Condition
Group * Condition
Total Utterance Number
Group

Mean Utterance Length
Group
Condition

Group * Condition
3.54, 180.54
3.63
.06
.01j
a
Control > schizophrenia = feigning
b
low load > medium > high (Note: this effect was not robust to family-wise Bonferronicorrection.)
c
Controls: low = medium >high; feigning and schizophrenia: low > medium = high
d
Schizophrenia = feigning> control
e
Control > schizophrenia
f
low load>high
g
Schizophrenia: low > medium > high
h
Schizophrenia > control
i
high load >low
j
Schizophrenia: high>low(Note: this interaction effect was not robust to family-wise Bonferronicorrection.)
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Figure 6: Alogia scores across cognitive load conditions
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Schizophrenia

schizophrenia group (F (2, 82) = 9.14, ηρ² = .18, p< .001), which was robust to Bonferroni
correction; with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise-comparisons revealing that the
schizophrenia group used significantly shorter utterances in the high cognitive load condition, as
compared to both the low (p< .001) and medium (p = .04) load conditions, which were not
significantly different from one another (p = .49). There were no significant main effects of
condition within either the control (F (2, 56) = 2.20, ηρ² = .07, p = .12) or feigning (F (1.64,
54.0) = 2.48, ηρ² = .07, p = .10) group. See Figure 6.
For Mean Utterance Length, there were significant main effects of group and
condition, as well as a significant interaction. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that the
schizophrenia group had significantly longer utterances than the control group (p< .01), but the
feigning group did not significantly differ from either other group (ps > .14). Bonferronicorrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that participants made shorter utterances in
the low than the high cognitive load condition (p< .001), but the medium cognitive load
condition did not significantly differ from either other condition (ps > .29). With regard to the
interaction effect, post-hoc simple-effects analysis revealed a significant effect of condition
within the schizophrenia group (F (1.76, 72.01) = 7.96, ηρ² = .16, p = .001), which was robust to
application of Bonferroni correction; with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise-comparisons
revealing that the schizophrenia group used significantly longer utterances in the high cognitive
load condition as compared to the low cognitive load condition (p< .001),but the medium load
condition was not significantly different from either the low or high load conditions (ps > .08).
There were no significant main effects of condition for either the control (F (2, 56) = 2.27, ηρ² =
.08, p = .11) or feigning (F (1.67, 55.18) = 1.45, ηρ² = .04, p = .24) group. See Figure 6.
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In summary, similar to performance on the affective reactivity task, on the
cognitive load task the control group used significantly more pauses, with a shorter mean pause
length, than either the schizophrenia or feigning groups. In other words, the feigning group was
able to successfully resemble the schizophrenia group in its use of longer (and conversely fewer
overall) pauses. The control group also used more and longer utterances than the schizophrenia
group. Notably, these main effects of group (ps ≤ .012) were robust to Bonferroni-correction for
family-wise error within the Alogia analysis set. For Total Pause Number, all three groups used
fewer pauses as cognitive load increased; however, while this effect appeared to emerge when
comparing the medium to high cognitive load condition for the control group, for the
schizophrenia and feigning groups it emerged when comparing the low to medium load
condition.
With regard to both Total Utterance Number and Mean Utterance Length, only
the schizophrenia group participants demonstrated significant change across the conditions,
using fewer utterances as they moved from the low to medium condition, and longer utterances
as they moved from the low to high condition. These interaction effects were not robust to
Bonferroni-correction for family-wise error for Mean Utterance Length (p = .014), but they were
robust to such correction for Total Pause Number (p = .005) and Total Utterance Number (p =
.006). See Figure 6.
Blunt Affect.Cognitive load speech task means and standard deviations for Blunt
Affect variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 16. Emphasis and Inflection scores are
provided as log-transformed and corrected for Mean Utterance Length.
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Table 16: Means (± standard deviations) for Blunt Affect variables across groups, for cognitive
load task conditions
Blunt Affect

Control

Feigning

Schizophrenia

Low Load

256.99 (47.47)

274.32 (79.16)

268.06 (58.65)

Medium Load

258.72 (56.41)

273.71 (71.96)

262.84 (62.01)

High Load

267.29 (48.66)

265.19 (72.10)

259.05 (65.45)

Low Load

85.29 (20.84)

86.78 (28.06)

89.29 (23.55)

Medium Load

80.92 (17.61)

90.23 (29.87)

84.23 (22.89)

High Load

87.90 (19.89)

85.57 (28.09)

88.81(21.53)

Low Load

1.60 (.67)

1.62 (.63)

1.24 (.53)

Medium Load

1.69 (.66)

1.59 (.70)

1.27 (.51)

High Load

1.56 (.53)

1.55 (.62)

1.22 (.48)

Low Load

1.22 (.46)

1.21 (.43)

.90 (.48)

Medium Load

1.22 (.47)

1.24 (.47)

.90 (.46)

High Load

1.29 (.42)

1.29 (.46)

.89 (.42)

Local Emphasis

Global Emphasis

Local F0 Inflection

Global F0 Inflection

Results for ANOVAs examining Blunt Affect variables across cognitive load
conditions are set forth in Table 17. For Local Emphasis, there were no significant main effects.
There was a trend-level interaction, but post-hoc simple effects analysis did not reveal any
significant main effects of condition within any groups (Fs < 1.93, ps > .15). There were no
significant main effects or interactions for Global Emphasis. See Figure 7.
There were no significant main effects or interactions for Local F0 Inflection
(controlling for gender). For Global F0 Inflection (controlling for gender, age, and ethnicity),
there was a significant main effect of group, but no significant main effect of condition or
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Table 17: ANOVAs comparing groups on Blunt Affect variables, across cognitive load task
conditions
Blunt Affect

df

F

ηρ²

p

Local Emphasis
Group

2, 102

.22

.00

.80

Condition

1.86, 189.48

.22

.00

.79

Group * Condition

3.72, 189.48

2.36

.04

.06

Group

2, 102

.28

.01

.76

Condition

2, 204

.43

.00

.64

4, 204

1.20

.02

.31

2, 100

1.90

.04

.16

Condition

2, 200

1.49

.02

.23

Group * Condition

4, 200

.41

.01

.80

2, 98

4.16

.08

.02a

2, 16

.02

.00

.99

Global Emphasis

Group * Condition
Local F0 Inflection
(controlling for gender)
Group

Global F0 Inflection
(controlling for gender, age, ethnicity)
Group
Condition
a

Group * Condition
4, 196
.25
.01
.91
Control > schizophrenia (Note: this effect was not robust to family-wise Bonferroni-correction.)

interaction. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that the schizophrenia
group used significantly less F0 Global Inflection than the control group (p = .02), but the
feigning group was not significantly different from either other group (ps > .28). However, this
main effect of group (p = .019) was not robust to application of a Bonferroni correction for
family-wise error within Blunt Affect analysis set. See Figure 7.
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Feigning Group
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Figure 7: Corrected and log transformed Blunt Affect scores across cognitive load conditions
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Formant variables.Cognitive load speech task means and standard deviations for
Formant variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 18. Inflection scores are provided as logtransformed and corrected for Mean Utterance Length.

Table 18: Means (± standard deviations) for Formant variables across groups, for cognitive load
task conditions
Formant variables

Control

Feigning

Schizophrenia

Low Load

4.44 (1.00)

4.85 (2.62)

5.02 (1.61)

Medium Load

4.50 (1.39)

4.63 (2.33)

4.82 (1.66)

High Load

4.42 (1.06)

4.66 (2.37)

5.28 (1.89)

Low Load

2.14 (.69)

2.06 (1.23)

2.39 (.90)

Medium Load

2.25 (.81)

2.09 (1.18)

2.42 (.88)

High Load

2.45 (.86)

2.25 (1.52)

2.66 (.98)

Low Load

3.05 (.63)

2.02 (.51)

2.67 (.85)

Medium Load

3.00 (.92)

1.94 (.45)

2.60 (.77)

High Load

2.98 (.61)

1.95 (.44)

2.60 (.70)

Low Load

1.38 (.41)

.53 (.35)

1.21 (.55)

Medium Load

1.37 (.53)

.59 (.36)

1.14 (.45)

High Load

1.52 (.44)

.56 (.36)

1.15 (.46)

Local F1 Inflection

Global F1 Inflection

Local F2 Inflection

Global F2 Inflection

Results for ANOVAs examining Formant variables across cognitive load
conditions are set forth in Table 19. There were no significant main effects or interactions for
Local F1 Inflection or Global F1 Inflection (controlling for age). For Local F2 Inflection
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(controlling for ethnicity and age) there was a significant main effect of group, but no significant
main effect of condition or group by condition interaction. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the control group used significantly more Local F2 Inflection
than both the schizophrenia (p = .03) and feigning (p< .001) groups, and the schizophrenia used
significantly more Local F2 Inflection than the feigning group (p< .01). See Figure 8.
For Global F2 Inflection (correcting for ethnicity and age), there was a significant
main effect of group, a trend-level main effect of condition, and a significant interaction.
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed that the control group used significantly more
Global F2 Inflection than both the schizophrenia (p = .03) and feigning (p< .001) groups, and the
schizophrenia used significantly more Global F2 Inflection than the feigning group (p< .001); but
there were no significant differences among conditions (ps > .12). With regard to the interaction
effect, however, post-hoc simple-effects analysisdid not reveal any significant effects of
condition within any group, upon application of Bonferroni correction (Fs < 4.84, ps > .02). See
Figure 8.
In summary, similar to performance on the affective reactivity task, in the
cognitive load task the feigning group used less F2 Local and Global Inflection than the
schizophrenia and control groups. In other words, the feigning group tended to use poor formant
inflection (i.e., less tongue movement-based articulation) in attempt to mimic schizophrenia
symptoms. Notably, both main effects of group for these variables (ps < .001) were robust to
application of Bonferroni correction to account for family-wise error within the Formant variable
analysis set. The feigning group’s strategy did distinguish it from the control group for F2 Local
and Global Inflection, in a direction matching that distinguishing the schizophrenia group from
the control group (i.e., the schizophrenia group also used less Local and Global F2 Inflection
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than the control group). However, the feigning group over-exaggerated this effect, such that it
also used significantly less F2 Local and Global Inflection than the schizophrenia group.

Table 19: ANOVAs comparing groups on Formant variables, across cognitive load task
conditions
Formant variables

df

F

ηρ²

p

Local F1 Inflection
Group

1, 100

1.24

.02

.29

Condition

2, 200

1.32

.01

.27

Group * Condition

4, 200

1.11

.02

.35

2, 99

.60

.01

.55

1.86, 184.30

1.41

.01

.32

3.72, 184.30

1.11

.00

.98

2, 98

14.72

.23

<.001a

Condition

1.85, 181.57

.66

.01

.51

Group * Condition

3.71

.04

.00

1.00

Global F2 Inflection
(controlling for ethnicity and age)
Group

2, 98

24.97

.34

<.001a

2, 196

2.89

.03

.06

Global F1 Inflection
(controlling for age)
Group
Condition
Group * Condition
Local F2 Inflection
(controlling for ethnicity and age)
Group

Condition

Group * Condition
4, 196
4.51
.08
<.01b
a
Control > schizophrenia > feigning.
b
Post-hoc analysis did not reveal any significant differences across conditions for any group.
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Figure 8: Corrected and log transformed Formant variable scores across cognitive load conditions

78

Cognitive task performance.Cognitive load speech task means and standard
deviations for cognitive task performance variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 20.

Table 20: Means (± standard deviations) for cognitive task performance variables across groups,
for cognitive load task conditions
Cognitive Task
Performance
d’

Control

Feigning

Schizophrenia

Medium Load

3.38(.30)

.64(1.31)

2.36(1.49)

High Load

1.06(1.58)

.78(1.35)

-.01(1.70)

Medium Load

.39(.45)

.08(.46)

.27(.50)

High Load

.28(.73)

-.08(.45)

.11(.64)

ln(β)

Results for ANOVAs examining cognitive task performance variables are set
forth in Table 21. For d’ performance values across groups and medium to high cognitive load
conditions (controlling for age), there were significant main effects of group and condition, and a
significant group by condition interaction. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons
revealed that the control group performed significantly better than both the schizophrenia (p =
.001) and feigning groups (p< .001), and the schizophrenia group performed better than the
feigning group at a trend level (p = .06); and participants performed better under medium than
high cognitive load (p < .001). Post-hoc simple-effects analysis of the interaction effect revealed
that both the control (t = 8.28, p< .001), and schizophrenia (t = 10.56, p< .001) groups performed
significantly worse in the high load condition, as compared to the medium load condition; but the
feigning group’s performance was not significantly different across conditions (t = -.51, p = .62).
See Figure 9.
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Table 21: ANOVAs comparing groups on cognitive task performance variables, across medium
and high cognitive load task conditions
df

F

ηρ²

p

d’ (controlling for age)
Group

2, 117

16.32

.22

< .001a

Condition

1, 117

6.20

.05

.01b

Group * Condition

2, 117

23.27

.29

< .001c

Group

2, 118

7.06

.11

.001d

Condition

1, 118

4.11

.03

.05e

ln(β)

Group * Condition
2, 118
.05
.00
.95
Control > schizophrenia > feigning
b
Medium load > high load
c
Schizophrenia and control: low > high
d
Control = schizophrenia > feigning
e
Medium load > high load (Note: this effect was not robust to family-wise Bonferronicorrection.)
a

For ln(β) performance values across groups and medium to high cognitive load
conditions, there were significant main effects of group and condition, but no significant group
by condition interaction. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that the feigning group’s ln(β) values
were significantly lower than those of the control (p = .001) and schizophrenia (p = .05) groups,
indicating that the feigning group demonstrated a relatively moreliberal bias (i.e., greater number
of both correct and incorrect responses); but the schizophrenia and control groups were not
significantly different from one another (p = .23). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise
comparisons revealed that participants tended to have a more conservative bias (i.e., smaller
number of both correct and incorrect responses) in the medium cognitive load condition as
compared to the high cognitive load condition, where they tended to show a more liberal bias (p
= .05). See Figure 9.
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Figure 9:Cognitive performance variables across medium and high cognitive load conditions

In summary, the feigning group performed worse than both the schizophrenia and
control groups on the cognitive task, and failed to demonstrate the pattern of impairment
demonstrated by both the schizophrenia and control groups (i.e., lowered accuracy in the high as
compared to medium cognitive load condition). The feigning group also demonstrated a more
liberal bias (i.e., more correct and incorrect responses) than the schizophrenia or control groups.
Notably, the main effects of group for both d’ and ln(β),the main effect of condition (p = .014)
and the group by condition interaction for d’, were robust to Bonferroni correction (although the
main effect of condition was not for ln(β)).
Feigning group post-task questionnaire
Table 22 sets forth feigning group participants’ responses to a post-task
questionnaire about their performance on the speech tasks.
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Table 22: Summary of feigning group participants’ responses to the post-task questionnaire
(indicating % endorsing each response choice)
1. How confident are your performance on these tasks would have successfully convinced
an examiner that you have schizophrenia?
Not at all
Slightly
Fairly
Quite
Very
30%

32%

23%

15%

0%

2. Which symptoms of schizophrenia did you focus on simulating in your attempt to
convince the examiner that you have schizophrenia (indicate all that apply)?
Thought
Negative
Cognitive
Hallucinations
Delusions
Disorder
Symptoms
Symptoms
53%

50%

65%

48%

53%

3. In addition to the information provided by the examiner, did you rely on any other
additional sources of information about schizophrenia in creating your strategy for
attempting to convince the examiner that you have schizophrenia (indicate all that
apply)?
Know/work with
Movies or
Educational
Relied only on
News
Other
someone with serious television
materials (e.g.,
information
mental illness
psychology class)
provided
33%

48%

28%

43%

15%

10%

Overall, participants were not highly confident in their ability to feign
schizophrenia symptoms. Though 65% of feigning participants reported that they attempted to
portray thought disorder (the symptom category with the highest endorsement with regard to
feigning strategy), as a whole the feigning group was not successfully able to feign cognitive
disorganization as measured by the CDI. Furthermore, there were no significant differences
between individuals who reported that they attempted to simulate thought disorder and those
who did not on CDI scores across any of the speech task conditions (ts < .92, ps > .36). There
were also no significant differences between those who endorsed attempted simulation of
cognitive symptoms (53%) and those who did not on any cognitive performance variables (ts <
1.43, ps > .16).
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There were a few (mostly trend-level) differences between those who endorsed
attempted simulation of negative symptoms (48%) and those who did not on verbal expressivity
variables. Interestingly, those who endorsed simulation of negative symptoms used significantly
more Local F2 Inflection in the unpleasant/high-arousal affective reactivity condition (M = 2.09,
SD = .53) than those who did not (M = 1.78, SD = .35; p = .05). They also used more Local F2
Inflection in the high cognitive load condition (endorsing: M = 2.08, SD = .50; not endorsing: M
= 1.82, SD = .33; p= .07), pleasant/high arousal condition (endorsing: M = 2.09, SD = .46; not
endorsing: M = 1.80, SD = .49; p = .08), and unpleasant/low-arousal condition (endorsing: M =
2.04, SD = .49; not endorsing: M = 1.79, SD = .47; p = .06) at a trend level. It is thus unclear
what those who thought they were portraying negative symptoms were attempting to
behaviorally display. In any event, it should be recalled that as a group the feigners were not
successful in using low levels of F2 Inflection to accurately feign negative symptoms, as they
significantly under-articulated their speech so as to be distinguishable from the schizophrenia
group. There were no other significant differences between those who endorsed attempted
simulation of negative symptoms and those who did not on any other verbal expressivity
variables (ts < 1.67, ps > .10).
Confidence in feigning ability was significantly correlated (using nonparametric
Spearman correlations) with CDI scores in the pleasant/low-arousal condition (r = .42, p = .01),
Global F1 Inflection in the unpleasant/high arousal condition (r = .39, p = .02), and Global F2
Inflection in the pleasant/high arousal condition (r = .33, p = .05). It was also correlated with
Global Intensity in the pleasant/low-arousal condition (r = .31, p = .07), Global F1 Inflection in
the pleasant/low arousal (r = .29, p = .09) and unpleasant/low-arousal (r = .29, p = .08)
conditions, and Global F2 Inflection in the unpleasant/low-arousal condition (r = .31, p = .06) at
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trend levels.Again, though, it should be recalled that high levels of Formant Inflection were
associated with identifiable feigning, as those in the feigning group demonstrated higher levels of
expressivity deficits than individuals in the schizophrenia group. There were no significant
correlations between feigning group confidence level and any other dependent variables (rs <
.28, ps > .10).
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DISCUSSION
This study sought to examine whether certain characteristics of speech
disorganization and verbal flattening would discriminate between individuals with schizophrenia
and healthy adults instructed to feign symptoms of schizophrenia. The hypotheses of this study
generally predicted that the schizophrenia group would demonstrate more referential failures and
expressivity deficits than either the controls or feigning group, who would not differ significantly
from one another on these variables; and that the schizophrenia group would show a pattern of
exacerbation of these disorganization and negative symptoms that was larger in magnitude than
either the control or feigning group as cognitive and affective load increased by task condition.
In addition, this study predicted that the feigning group would perform worse than either the
schizophrenia or control groups on a series of cognitive performance tasks (although the
schizophrenia group would also be expected to perform worse than the control group); and that
the schizophrenia and control groups would demonstrate a pattern of lowered accuracy in the
high, as compared to the medium, cognitive load condition (reflecting true effort spread across
conditions of variable difficulty), but the feigning group would not, possibly even performing
worse in the lower load condition, due to intentionally poor performance that was not sensitive to
item difficulty level. These hypotheses were partially supported.
The first hypothesis predicted that in the affective reactivity speech task there
would be (i) significant main effects for participant group, such that the schizophrenia group
would demonstrate significantly more overall referential failures and expressivity deficits than
both the honest control group and feigners, who would not differ from one another; and (ii)
significant condition by group interactions, such that the magnitude of increase in referential
failures and expressivity deficits for the schizophrenia group in comparing the pleasant condition
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to the unpleasant condition and/or the low-arousal to high-arousal condition would be
significantly larger than for controls or feigners.
With regard to main effects of group, this predicted pattern was found only for
CDI scores. However, there was no main effect of condition or interaction for CDI scores across
affective reactivity conditions. Thus, the prior findings of Docherty et al., that schizophrenia
patients may demonstrate an increase in speech disorganization in discussion of affectively
unpleasant, as compared to pleasant, topics (1998), and at a larger magnitude than that displayed
by controls, first-degree relatives, or depressed patients (2001) were not replicated. This failure
to replicate these prior findings may be due to the fact that the Docherty et al. (1998,
2001)studies examined 10-minute speech samples, collected on separate days, which may have
been more effective at inducing pleasant and unpleasant affective states than the 90 second
speech samples collected, back-to-back, in the present study. In addition, unlike the present study
in which the interviewer remained silent during the speech sample recording procedure in order
to facilitate acoustic analysis procedures, the interviewers in the Docherty et al. (1998, 2001)
studies interacted with the participants were necessary to keep participants focused on the
instructed affective topic.
With regard to Formant variables (i.e., vocal expressivity variables related to
tongue movements), the feigning group was distinguishable from the schizophrenia group in the
affective reactivity task, but through display of a pattern opposite that of the pattern predicted.
The feigning group demonstrated less vocal inflection than the schizophrenia group for Global
F1 Inflection, and less vocal inflection than both the schizophrenia and control groups for Local
and Global F2 Inflection. In other words, these variables did distinguish the feigning group from
the schizophrenia group in a pattern that would suggest feigning, but did so because the feigning
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group over-exaggerated such symptoms. It appears as though, in an attempt to feign negative
symptoms, the feigning group generally focused on using poor, mumbling, or slurry articulation;
however, this strategy resulted in the feigning group exhibiting significantly greater expressivity
deficits than even the schizophrenia group. The only significant interaction (for Local F2
Inflection) for the affective reactivity task was not robust to family-wise Bonferroni-correction,
and only indicated differential patterns of expressivity across affective reactivity conditions for
the control group (i.e., relative increase in inflection in the pleasant/high arousal condition).
Therefore, this interaction was not relevant to the goal of identification of feigned symptoms.
By contrast, for Total Pause Number and Mean Pause Length (both variables in
the Alogia category), feigning group participants actually more closely resembled the
schizophrenia group in the affective reactivity task; and they were both distinguishable from the
control group, which used more frequent and shorter pauses than either the schizophrenia or
feigning group. In other words, on these dimensions of Alogia, participants in the feigning group
appeared to successfully resemble the schizophrenia group in a manner that distinguished them
from healthy controls, by demonstrating Alogia symptoms through use of longer (and conversely
less frequent) pauses.
The second hypothesis predicted, similarly, that in the cognitive load speech task
there would be (i) significant main effects for participant group, such that the schizophrenia
group would demonstrate significantly more overall referential failures and expressivity deficits
than the honest control group and feigners, who would not differ from one another; and (ii)
significant group by condition interactions, such that the magnitude of increase in referential
failures and expressivity deficits for the schizophrenia group as working memory load increased
would be significantly larger than for controls or feigners.
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Main effects of condition were apparent on several of the dependent variables in
the cognitive speech task,in a manner consistent with existing research examining cognitive load
theory (Paas, et al., 2010; Sweller, 2010), in healthy adults and schizotypy (Cohen et al., 2011)
and schizophrenia patients (e.g., Cohen et al., 2013, manuscript in preparation; Melinder &
Barch, 2003). However, there were no significant main effects of group that demonstrated the
predicted pattern of performance (i.e., that the feigning group would be distinguishable from the
schizophrenia group because feigners would not successfully replicate disorganization or
negative speech symptoms, and would therefore more closely resemble controls). Similar to the
affective reactivity task, though, there were group differences in Formant variable
performance—specifically, Local and Global F2 Inflection—that distinguished the feigning
group from the schizophrenia and control groups on the cognitive load task due to the feigning
group’s over-exaggeration of such symptoms. On Local and Global F2 Inflection, the
schizophrenia group demonstrated significantly more verbal flattening than the control group;
but the feigning group demonstrated significantly more verbal flattening than even the
schizophrenia group. Again, it appears as though participants in the feigning group attempted to
use poor, mumbling, or slurry articulation; but they over-shot the goal by exhibiting significantly
greater expressivity deficits than even the schizophrenia group.
Main effects of group for Total Utterance Number, Mean Utterance Length (both
variables in the Alogia category) and Global F0 Inflection (a variable in the Blunt Affect
category) on the cognitive load task only distinguished the schizophrenia and control groups
(although group effects for Global F0 Inflection were not robust to family-wise Bonferroni
correction). Only the schizophrenia group demonstrated a differential pattern for Total Utterance
Number and Mean Utterance Length across cognitive load conditions (although the interaction
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for Mean Utterance Length was not robust to family-wise Bonferroni correction). The
schizophrenia group appeared to use longer and fewer utterances as cognitive task difficulty
increased. Qualitative examination of participants’ performance in the high cognitive load
condition suggests that this may be due to the fact that participants in the schizophrenia group
tended not to produce complete narratives in the high cognitive load condition, but instead began
simply listing items that fell into the category suggested by the neutral task instructions (e.g.,
when asked to speak about “food” in the high load condition, participants in the schizophrenia
group frequently provided responses such as “I like to eat [slowly listing different foods for the
remainder of the speech sample]”). Therefore, speech patterns were simplified in response to the
increase cognitive load, but not in a manner measured by the present variables in the anticipated
direction (i.e., shorter utterances). Similarly, this response pattern (schizophrenia patients’
decreased use of complex narrative as cognitive load increased) may explain the lack of a
significant group effect for the CDI variable in the cognitive load task.
By contrast, similar to the affective load condition, for Total Pause Number and
Mean Pause Length (both variables in the Alogia category), feigning group participants in the
cognitive load task more closely resembled the schizophrenia group; and they were both
distinguishable from the control group, which used more frequent and shorter pauses than either
the schizophrenia or feigning group. In other words, on these dimensions of Alogia, participants
in the feigning group did appear to successfully resemble the schizophrenia group in a manner
that distinguished them from healthy controls, by demonstrating Alogia symptoms through use
of longer (and conversely less frequent) pauses. There was also a significant group by cognitive
load condition interaction for Total Pause Number and Mean Pause Length. All three groups
demonstrated a similar pattern of increasing Alogia as cognitive load increased. However, for the
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control group this effect emerged in moving between the medium and high load conditions,
whereas for both the feigning and schizophrenia groups this effect emerged earlier, when
comparing the low and medium load conditions. In other words, the control group began to show
a significant increase in Alogia (though pause use patterns) only when the cognitive load task
increased from an easier to a more difficult level; but the schizophrenia and feigning groups
began to show a significant increase in Alogia when the easier cognitive task was first
introduced.
The third hypothesis predicted that in the cognitive load speech task there would
be (i) significant group effects, such that the feigners would demonstrate poorer overall cognitive
performance compared to the schizophrenia group, who would in turn demonstrate poorer
overall cognitive performance compared to the honest control group; and (ii) significant
interactions, such that the schizophrenia and honest control groups would perform worse during
conditions of higher working memory load than the medium cognitive load condition, but
feigners would perform worse during the medium load condition than high load condition. This
hypothesis was generally supported. The schizophrenia group demonstrated significantly worse
accuracy (as measured by d’) than the control group on the cognitive performance task; but the
feigning group demonstrated significantly worse accuracy than the schizophrenia group. The
feigning group also demonstrated a more liberal bias (as measured by ln(β), representing a
combination of more item hits and misses, possibly suggestive of either random responding or
increased intentional misses) than either the control or schizophrenia groups. Additionally,
differential group performance on the cognitive task partially supported the second part of this
hypothesis, in that both the schizophrenia and control groups demonstrated the expected pattern
of lowered accuracy in the high load condition, as comparedto the medium load condition; but
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the feigning group did not, suggesting an intentionally poor performance that was not sensitive to
item difficulty level. In other words, the feigning group simply performed poorly across both
levels of item difficulty, at a magnitude that was unrealistic even for individuals with cognitive
impairment symptoms typically found in schizophrenia.
Significant results in this study (i.e., those relating to CDI, Alogia, Formant, and
cognitive performance variables) may be considered along two dimensions: (i) the success or
failure of the feigning group’s attempt to portray symptoms of thought disorganization,negative
speech symptoms, and/or cognitive deficits, and (ii) the pattern of group effects or interactions
determining the success or failure of the attempt. Thus, the following four patterns may be
examined: (1) instances where the attempt to feign a symptom was unsuccessful because the
feigning group’s performance was distinguishable from that of the schizophrenia group, and
instead more closely resembled the control group; (2) instances where the attempt to feign a
symptom was unsuccessful because the feigning group’s performance was distinguishable from
both the schizophrenia and control groups, appearing overly impaired; (3) instances where the
attempt to feign a symptom was unsuccessful because the feigning group failed to demonstrate
the expected pattern of change across cognitive load conditions as demonstrated by both
schizophrenia and control groups, and (4) instances in which the attempt to feign a symptom was
successful, with the performance of the feigning group resembling that of the schizophrenia
group, and both the feigning group and schizophrenia group being distinguished from controls.
The first type of pattern—i.e., where the attempt to feign a symptom was
unsuccessful because the feigning group’s performance was distinguishable from that of the
schizophrenia group, and instead more closely resembled the control group—was evident in CDI
performance in the affective reactivity speech task. In essence, even after being provided with a
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specific description of disorganization symptoms, and despite the fact that 65% of participants in
the feigning group reported that they attempted to feign thought disorder on the speech tasks,
participants in the feigning group, on the whole, could not successfully mimic the pattern of
referential failures commonly seen in schizophrenia. This is consistent with clinical observations
made by Resnick and Knoll (2008). Furthermore, there were no significant differences between
individuals in the feigning group who reported that they attempted to feign such symptoms and
those who did not on CDI scores across any of the speech task conditions. However, confidence
level in overall feigning ability was positively correlated with CDI scores in the pleasant/low
arousal affective reactivity condition, at a medium effect size. Thus, within a more confident
subset of the feigning group there may have been some ability to feign speech disorganization.
Like other methods for detecting feigning of symptoms of psychosis, then, there would be
expected to be a certain percentage of false negatives not detected by a measure of symptom
feigning focused on inability to replicate referential failures. This fact underscores the crucial
nature of a multi-symptom, multi-method approach to malingering detection.
The second type of pattern—i.e., where the attempt to feign a symptom was
unsuccessful because the feigning group’s performance was distinguishable from both the
schizophrenia and control groups,appearing overly impaired—was evident in the feigning
group’s use of Formant inflection and performance on the cognitive task. This pattern of
unsuccessful feigning is more consistent with response styles identified by existing malingering
assessment tools, i.e., amplified presentation of symptom intensity (Rogers, 2008b). In
examining patterns of Formant inflection (particularly, Local and Global F2 Inflection in the
affective reactivity and cognitive load tasks, and Global F1 Inflection in the affective reactivity
task), the feigning group appears, overall, to have used poor formant inflection (i.e., less tongue
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movement-based articulation) in attempt to mimic schizophrenia symptoms. This strategy did
distinguish the feigning group from the control group in a direction matching that distinguishing
the schizophrenia group from the control group (i.e., less inflection). However, the feigning
group over-exaggerated this effect, such that it also used significantly less inflection than the
schizophrenia group. Nearly half (48%) of individuals in the feigning group reported attempting
to feign negative symptoms, but there was no evidence that individuals who attempted to portray
negative symptoms were able to demonstrate decreased Formant inflection. Interestingly, those
who reported an attempt to portray negative symptoms used significantly more Local F2
Inflection in the unpleasant/high arousal affective reactivity condition compared to those who did
not, and used more Local F2 Inflection in the high cognitive load condition, and the
pleasant/high arousal and unpleasant/low arousal affective load conditions, at a trend level. Thus,
it is unclear what negative speech symptoms those who endorsed portrayal of such symptoms
were attempting to display. In any event, individuals in the feigning group tended, as a whole, to
overshoot the mark, thereby indicating intentional under-articulation at a level exceeding even
that typically observed among individuals with schizophrenia.
Similarly, the feigning group distinguished itself from both the schizophrenia and
control groups by performing poorly across cognitive performance variables (d’ and ln(β)) in a
manner that indicated significantly lower accuracy than was evident even within the
schizophrenia group (see also Kertzman, et al., 2006; Melinder & Barch, 2003), as well as a
more liberal response bias.This is consistent with prior research finding that individuals feigning
psychosis frequently also attempt to feign cognitive impairment (Resnick & Knoll, 2008). There
were no significant differences between individuals in the feigning group who reported
attempting to feign cognitive symptoms (53%) and those who did not on these variables. There
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were also no significant relationships between overall confidence in successful feigning of
symptoms and any cognitive performance variables. Thus, feigning participants were neither
accurate in their perceptions of whether they actually demonstrated this (unsuccessful) feigning
strategy, nor confident in their ability to successfully do so.
The third type of pattern—i.e., where the attempt to feign a symptom was
unsuccessful because the feigning group failed to demonstrate the expected pattern of change
across cognitive load conditions as demonstrated by both schizophrenia and control groups—was
evident in cognitive task performance accuracy (d’). The schizophrenia and control groups’ d’
scores decreased as cognitive task difficulty increased. By contrast, the feigning group simply
performed poorly across both levels of item difficulty, at a magnitude that was unrealistic even
for individuals with symptoms cognitive impairment typically found in schizophrenia. This
pattern is consistent with prior findings of Kertzman, et al. (2006). Identification of feigning
through this pattern of response style capitalizes on the absence of an anticipated performance
curve and floor effect among feigners (Rogers, 2008b). In other words, genuine patients produce
predictable patterns of increasing errors with increased item difficulty, while feigners may not
recognize that some simple cognitive tasks could be completed by even impaired individuals,
and tend to demonstrate less of a distinction between items based on difficulty. As noted above,
feigning participants were neither accurate in their perceptions of whether they actually
demonstrated this (unsuccessful) feigning strategy, nor confident in their ability to successfully
do so.
The fourth type of pattern—i.e., where the attempt to feign a symptom was
successful because the performance of the feigning group resembled that of the schizophrenia
group, and both the feigning group and schizophrenia group were distinguishable from
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controls—was evident in the pattern of pause use across both the affective reactivity and
cognitive load tasks. In both tasks, the control group used significantly more pauses, with a
shorter mean pause length, than either the schizophrenia or feigning groups. In other words, the
feigning group was able to successfully resemble the schizophrenia group in its use of longer
(and conversely fewer overall) pauses, thereby mimicking the schizophrenia group’s Alogia.
Furthermore, while the control group demonstrated a significant increase in pause-related Alogia
as the cognitive task moved from a lower to a higher level of difficulty, the schizophrenia and
feigning groups both demonstrated a significant increase in pause-related Alogia at an earlier
stage in the process, when the cognitive task was first introduced (as compared to the neutral free
speech condition not accompanied by a cognitive task, i.e., the low cognitive load condition).
Pause-based variables, however, were not related to either reported attempt to feign negative
symptoms or overall confidence in feigning performance. This lack of association between
strategy and result raises the question as to what factors may have contributed to the feigning
group’s successful use of pauses in the speech tasks, such that it was distinguishable from the
control group but not the schizophrenia group. On one hand, it could be that pause-based
expressivity deficits are easier than other more complex verbally-based deficits to intentionally
and accurately mimic. On the other hand, it could be that the added effort of maintaining false
speech compounded the cognitive load of the task for individuals in the feigning group, such that
at least with regard to pause use they genuinely resembled the schizophrenia group without doing
so purely through intentionally and disingenuously impaired performance (see Vrij, Granhad,
and Porter (2010) for a discussion of the technique of imposing cognitive load during interviews
as a means to detect deception).This interpretation would be consistent with Rogers and Knoll’s
(2008) clinical observation that malingerers may repeat questions or answer them slowly to give
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themselves time to generate a deceptive response. In either case, it would be advisable for
clinicians not to consider simple pause patterns in making a clinical judgment as to the
presentation of genuine versus feigned negative schizophrenia symptoms.
Overall, then the results suggests a few important factors for clinicians to keep in
mind when considering a possibly feigned presentation of psychosis. First, the presence of subtle
verbal indications of formal thought disorder (e.g., confused references, lack of grammatical
clarity, references that assume the listener has prior information that he or she does not) may be a
reliable indicator of the presence of a genuine psychiatric disorder that individuals without such
impairment are unlikely to successfully feign, even if attempting to do so. However, in order for
this discrepancy to be observed, an individual must be placed in a situation requiring
spontaneous generation of free speech. The high cognitive load condition did not provide such an
opportunity, possibly due to the limited complexity of speech content under high load conditions,
frequently resulting in category-naming style responses. Similarly, overly structured clinical
interviews requiring only brief responses may be less effective at capturing the presence or
absence of speech disorganization in suspected feigners than open-ended questions that require a
more lengthy narrative description. By contrast, the cognitive load condition allowed for
observation of excessive impairment by feigners on cognitive performance variables. Formant
variables also revealed such a pattern of excessive impairment, which was observed across both
speech conditions and may therefore possibly be observed under various interviewing styles.
While negative speech symptoms were measured as higher in the schizophrenia group then the
controls, specifically with regard to F2 Inflection, the feigning group used even less F2 Inflection
than either other group. Therefore, extremely poor articulation, or mumbling speech, might be
considered an additional red flag for clinicians confronted with a potential feigner. However,
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because the significance of this variable is one of magnitude, and not simple presence or absence
of a behavioral sign, it must be interpreted with significant caution. Moreover, while F2
Inflection has been shown to be associated with clinician ratings of negative symptoms
(Covington et al., 2012), it is yet unknown whether clinicians would be able to distinguish
between the level of Formant articulation deficits displayed by a genuine schizophrenia patient
versus a feigner based only on aural perception unassisted by technology. Additionally, it is
again notable that increased pause length, while a behavioral sign observable in patients with
schizophrenia, could also possibly be the result of cognitive resources strained by the demand of
generating description of or attempting to behaviorally manifest feigned symptoms. Thus,
clinicians with reason to suspect the presence of malingering behavior should be careful not to
assume that the presence of lengthy pauses (e.g., increased response latency during interviewing)
indicates the presence of genuine cognitive impairment.
This study does have several limitations that should be considered when
interpreting the results. First, despite participant recruitment attempts aimed at matching
participants on demographic variables across groups (i.e., gender, ethnicity, and age), practical
limitations of participant recruitment resulted in composition of groups that were significantly
different across demographic variables relevant to outcome variables. Therefore, these
demographic variables were controlled for statistically in analyses, where necessary, resulting in
a loss of statistical power. Individuals recruited for the feigning group (community members,
including some college students) may also simply not be representative of actual malingerers that
might be present in a forensic or clinical setting. However, this is a general limitation of a
simulation design, and would be expected to be addressed in the next anticipated step in a
malingering research line, i.e., a known-groups design. Additionally, the schizophrenia group
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was not screened for malingering, so in part this study reflects some of the flaws inherent in the
differential prevalence design (i.e., there may have actually been some malingerers in the patient
group, thus the assumption cannot be made that the patient group was 100% “genuine”).
However, participants in the schizophrenia group were recruited from non-forensic settings, most
often from environments suggesting chronic symptom presentation (i.e., group living facilities).
Furthermore, the simulation group here is composed completely of feigners, thus the magnitude
of difference in the likely rates of malingering between the two groups is vastly different than in
a differential prevalence design and it can be stated with greater certainty that there were more
feigners in the simulation group than in the patient group. Also, if there were any feigners
present in the schizophrenia group, any differences identified by the present analyses are likely
to be conservative with regard to their power to discriminate between feigners and true
schizophrenia patients. In addition, the schizophrenia group was psychiatrically medicated, an
effect that could not be statistically controlled. Medication side effects, therefore, could have
increased the magnitude of negative symptoms displayed by the schizophrenia group. On the
other hand, though, medication should improve performance on at least disorganization
symptoms in schizophrenia. Either way, given the direction of the patterns of symptom portrayal
by the feigning group, such effects would make the results of the present analyses more
conservative when compared to what one might expect when comparing feigners to an unmedicated schizophrenia group.
Another limitation is that the control group (along with the schizophrenia group)
was recruited as part of a larger study, and the feigning group was concurrently recruited by a
separate procedure that referenced “faking” of symptoms in the recruitment materials. Therefore
the assignment of community participants to the honest control and feigning groups was not truly
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“random,” but might reflect differential interest in acting, dishonesty, etc., which could
undermine the internal validity of the design as a simulation design. However, such a difference
may actually be more reflective of the character of malingerers in actual forensic or clinical
settings—i.e., those who find the idea of feigning symptoms to be something they would feel
comfortable attempting may actually be more likely to attempt to do so. In addition, data from
the feigning group was collected during a subset of the data collection processfor the larger study
(i.e., for the schizophrenia and honest control groups), such that the data collection process for
the larger study spanned almost two years (April 2010 through July 2012) whereas the data
collection process for the feigning group spanned only seven months (November 2011 through
May 2012). Consequently, a differential set of historical factors may have influenced the groups’
verbal behavior. In addition, it is possible that certain news stories about or fictional portrayals of
individuals with mental illness highlighted in national or local public media at the time that data
was collected from the feigning group may have specifically influenced the feigning group’s
perceptions of mental illness, in a manner that could limit the generalizability of findings
regarding the feigning group’s verbal behavior to other time periods or geographical locations.
Furthermore, there are more general limitations of malingering assessment
techniques that must be kept in mind when considering the potential future clinical application of
this study’s results. First, like all malingering assessment techniques, this method can actually
only suggest the presence or absence of feigning—it cannot speak to the motivation for feigning.
It ultimately remains the clinician’s responsibility to infer whether the motivation is external
(e.g., tangible reward or punishment avoidance), i.e., malingering, or internal (e.g., factitious
disorder). In addition, it is important for clinicians to consider the specific style of the suspected
malingerer and tailor assessment methods accordingly (Rogers, 2008b). For example, examining
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CDI differences should be limited to situations where suspected malingerers are attempting to
actively feign positive and/or disorganization symptoms, as schizophrenia patients with
prominent negative symptoms may not demonstrate affective reactivity in cognitive
disorganization (although they do show significantly higher overall baseline cognitive
disorganization as compared to controls (Cohen & Docherty, 2004)).
Moreover, while this study supports the proposition that quantitative examination
of certain speech-based disorganization and negative symptoms could add relevant incremental
validity to existing malingering assessment tools, several significant hurdles would need to be
overcome if the speech patterns discussed herein were ever to provide a future basis for
development of a feigning assessment tool designed for use in actual clinical practice. First, it
should be recognized that this is a preliminary examination of vocal patterns of individuals
feigning psychosis only. In particular, it is cautioned by Rogers(2008b) that the more complex
method of examining spurious patterns of psychopathology (e.g., the group by condition
interactions examined in the present study), requires extensive cross-validation. Furthermore, the
present study’s results can only suggest variables relevant to the presence or absence of feigned
schizophrenia. It is as of yet unclear to what extent the present procedure suggests the presence
of absence of other serious mental disorders that might also involve the transient experience of
hallucinations or delusions, such as major depressive disorder (APA, 2000) or PTSD (Morrison,
Frame, & Larkin, 2003). Relatedly, general medical conditions, neurological disorders, and
substance-induced psychosis would have to be ruled out before malingering could be inferred
from these methods, because positive symptoms may be present in these instances (especially
when visual or tactile hallucinations are prominent) without thought disorder, bizarre behavior,
or negative symptoms (Resnick & Knoll, 2008). In addition, while the CANS employs time-
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efficient computer-based scoring methods, the CDI requires the labor-intensive transcription of
speech samples, and training and hand-scoring methods that are significantly more timeconsuming. Thus, the development of a more practical approach to empirical measurement of
instances of communication disturbances in natural speech for clinical application may need to
be considered by future researchers.
Nonetheless, despite these limitations, the results of this study suggest a
promising avenue of research in the area of clinical detection of malingering of psychosis. Going
forward, it may be advisable for researchers to explore collection of speech samples of longer
duration (Docherty, 1998, 2001), and under conditions more directly relevant to clinical
assessment, such as responses generated during structured or semi-structured interviews aimed at
obtaining description of distressing psychiatric symptoms. Future studies could employ a known
groups design to examine the pattern of speech variables present among suspected malingerers in
a clinical setting. Future research should also examine potential nuances in feigned and genuine
schizophrenia speech patterns due to ethnic differences. In addition, these methods should be
explored in relation to their specificity in the detection of feigned schizophrenia symptoms,
through examination of the performances of known groups with other serious mental illness
(e.g., bipolar disorder).
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APPENDIX A
SCHIZOPHRENIA SUMMARY EXCERPTED FROM
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH(2009)
What are the symptoms of schizophrenia?
The symptoms of schizophrenia fall into three broad categories: positive symptoms, negative
symptoms, and cognitive symptoms.
Positive symptoms
Positive symptoms are psychotic behaviors not seen in healthy people. People with positive
symptoms often "lose touch" with reality. These symptoms can come and go. Sometimes they
are severe and at other times hardly noticeable, depending on whether the individual is receiving
treatment. They include the following:
Hallucinations are things a person sees, hears, smells, or feels that no one else can see, hear,
smell, or feel. "Voices" are the most common type of hallucination in schizophrenia. Many
people with the disorder hear voices. The voices may talk to the person about his or her behavior,
order the person to do things, or warn the person of danger. Sometimes the voices talk to each
other. People with schizophrenia may hear voices for a long time before family and friends
notice the problem.
Other types of hallucinations include seeing people or objects that are not there, smelling odors
that no one else detects, and feeling things like invisible fingers touching their bodies when no
one is near.
Delusions are false beliefs that are not part of the person's culture and do not change. The person
believes delusions even after other people prove that the beliefs are not true or logical. People
with schizophrenia can have delusions that seem bizarre, such as believing that neighbors can
control their behavior with magnetic waves. They may also believe that people on television are
directing special messages to them, or that radio stations are broadcasting their thoughts aloud to
others. Sometimes they believe they are someone else, such as a famous historical figure. They
may have paranoid delusions and believe that others are trying to harm them, such as by
cheating, harassing, poisoning, spying on, or plotting against them or the people they care about.
These beliefs are called "delusions of persecution."
Thought disorders are unusual or dysfunctional ways of thinking. One form of thought disorder
is called "disorganized thinking." This is when a person has trouble organizing his or her
thoughts or connecting them logically. They may talk in a garbled way that is hard to understand.
Another form is called "thought blocking." This is when a person stops speaking abruptly in the
middle of a thought. When asked why he or she stopped talking, the person may say that it felt as
if the thought had been taken out of his or her head. Finally, a person with a thought disorder
might make up meaningless words, or "neologisms."
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Movement disorders may appear as agitated body movements. A person with a movement
disorder may repeat certain motions over and over. In the other extreme, a person may become
catatonic. Catatonia is a state in which a person does not move and does not respond to others.
Catatonia is rare today, but it was more common when treatment for schizophrenia was not
available.2
"Voices" are the most common type of hallucination in schizophrenia.
Negative symptoms
Negative symptoms are associated with disruptions to normal emotions and behaviors. These
symptoms are harder to recognize as part of the disorder and can be mistaken for depression or
other conditions. These symptoms include the following:





"Flat affect" (a person's face does not move or he or she talks in a dull or monotonous
voice)
Lack of pleasure in everyday life
Lack of ability to begin and sustain planned activities
Speaking little, even when forced to interact.

People with negative symptoms need help with everyday tasks. They often neglect basic personal
hygiene. This may make them seem lazy or unwilling to help themselves, but the problems are
symptoms caused by the schizophrenia.
Cognitive symptoms
Cognitive symptoms are subtle. Like negative symptoms, cognitive symptoms may be difficult to
recognize as part of the disorder. Often, they are detected only when other tests are performed.
Cognitive symptoms include the following:




Poor "executive functioning" (the ability to understand information and use it to make
decisions)
Trouble focusing or paying attention
Problems with "working memory" (the ability to use information immediately after
learning it).

Cognitive symptoms often make it hard to lead a normal life and earn a living. They can cause
great emotional distress.
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APPENDIX B
NEUTRAL SPEECH TASK INSTRUCTIONS
1. Tell me as much as you can about where you live.
You can talk about what your home is like, who you live with, about your furniture and
rooms, and anything else you can think of. Include as many details as you can.
2. Tell me as much as you can about your hobbies.
You can talk about any hobby that you can think of, such as sports, walking, watching
TV or anything else. Include as many details as you can.
3. Tell me as much as you can about food.
You can talk about anything about food you can think of, such as what you like to eat,
what food you dislike, what you like to cook and how you cook, when you eat, where you
eat and anything else. Include as many details as you can.
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APPENDIX C
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AFFECTIVE LOAD SPEECH TASK
General Instructions:
Next, I want you to tell me some stories about yourself. I am interested in hearing about
experiences and people from your life. You choose what you want to talk about, but try to get
into the story and help me experience things as you did.
Please talk to me while concentrating on the computer screen. That is, talk to me without
looking at me.
You will have 90 seconds to tell your story. Please talk for the full time.
Condition-Specific Instructions:
Pleasant Low-Arousal Condition:
Tell me some stories about when you were feeling really good and calm, NOT energetic/excited.
Please get into telling this story as much as you can, and talk for 90 seconds.
Some things to talk about include:
1. Times you enjoyed being outside (e.g., sunset)
2. Times when you were really relaxed
3. Times when you felt at peace
Unpleasant Low-Arousal Condition:
Tell me some stories about when you were feeling really bad but NOT energetic/excited. Please
get into telling this story as much as you can, and talk for 90 seconds.
Some things to talk about include:
1. Times you felt sad or down
2. Times when you were feeling low energy
3. Times when you ended relationships or people/pets you know passed away.
Pleasant High-Arousal Condition:
Tell me some stories about when you were feeling really bad but energized. Please get into
telling this story as much as you can, and talk for 90 seconds.
Some things to talk about include:
1. Times you were really happy with someone
2. Times when you accomplished something really special
3. Times you were feeling at your best
Unpleasant High-Arousal Condition:
Tell me some stories about when you were feeling really bad but energized. Please get into
telling this story as much as you can, and talk for 90 seconds.
Some things to talk about include:
1. Times you were really furious at someone
2. Times you were really scared
3. Times you felt disgusted at someone or something
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APPENDIX D
POST-TASK QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE FEIGNING GROUP
1) How confident are your performance on these tasks would have successfully convinced
an examiner that you have schizophrenia (please indicate only one response)?
a. Not at all confident
b. Slightly confident
c. Fairly confident
d. Quite confident
e. Very confident
2) Which symptoms of schizophrenia did you focus on simulating in your attempt to
convince the examiner that you have schizophrenia (indicate all that apply)?
__ hallucinations
__ delusions
__ thought disorders
__ negative symptoms
__ cognitive symptoms
__ other (please indicate________________________________________)
3) In addition to the information provided by the examiner, did you rely on any other
additional sources of information about schizophrenia in creating your strategy for
attempting to convince the examiner that you have schizophrenia (indicate all that
apply)?
__ I know or have worked with someone with schizophrenia or other serious mental
illness
__ fictional movies or television about schizophrenia or other serious mental illness
__ news items related to mental illness
__ educational materials (e.g., psychology class)
__ other (please indicate________________________________________)
__ I relied only on the information provided by the examiner
4) Please briefly summarize your strategy for attempting to convince the examiner that you
have schizophrenia in the space provided below (you may also use the back of the page
for additional space if necessary).
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APPENDIX E
COPY OF THE LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY INTERNAL REVIEW
BOARD’S PROJECT APPROVAL FORM
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